Political Opinion and National Identity: Dilemma of the Sahrawi Ethnic Unity after 38 Years of Diaspora

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Abstract

Western Sahara has been called "the last colony" of Africa. The territory was colonized by Spain in 1884. During the pan-Maghreb liberation period in the 1950s, the local population, *Sahrawi* people also joined the resistance against colonial powers. However, when Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Mauritania obtained own independence as nation-state, the "Maghrebian dream" ended. Western Sahara has not only been left under the colonial rule until 1975, but it has not yet reached independence. When Spain left the territory, it was "recovered" by Moroccan-Mauritanian joint control against the Sahrawi's will. At the point, half of the Sahrawi population took refuge in Tindouf, southwestern Algeria and established the Sahara Democratic Republic (SADR) through the leadership of the Polisario Front in 1976. At the same time, the other half of the Sahrawi were left under the Moroccan occupation. Here Sahrawi ethnic diaspora is found.

After the diaspora, the Western Sahara conflict became more complicated. Despite of the approach by the international organizations, including the United Nations, the Sahrawi people have not yet used the right of self-determination and the conflict has not yet reached a solution. Thirty-eight years have already gone since the diaspora. While the Sahrawi are found in the different political spaces between Tindouf and Western Sahara (Moroccan controlled zone), the political opinion of the Sahrawi, particularly the future status of the territory, have varied considerably. Not all of them agree with total independence, but some might be able to accept autonomous plan under the Moroccan authority. At this point, it could be said that new political division within the ethnic group has emerged.

Taking the above situation into consideration, I will analyze the relation between political opinion and national identity in this paper. With reference the theory "*National Identity*" (1990) by Anthony Smith, the difference between ethnic and national identities, and the strength of nationalism are discussed. For example, one Sahrawi man from the Polisario talked about other Sahrawi who can accept the autonomous plan by the Moroccan authorities. The man said "do they become Moroccans?" In this case, it seems that one's political opinion can determine his/her national identity. While referring my field work data, the discussion is focused on; 1) transformation process of national identity, and 2) dilemma within Sahrawi national unity. According to the points, I describe what kind of crisis Sahrawi national unity has now and what will be a solution to overcome the crisis.

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The Map of Western Sahara and Southern part of Morocco

Source: International Military Operations Training Center (28/7/2013):
http://www.osrh.hr/smvo/Missions_en.asp?mission=MINURSO

Chapter 1. Introduction

1. General Description of the Western Sahara Problem

Western Sahara has been called "the last colony" of Africa. It is located in the north western coast of the African continent and has almost 266,000 square kilometers of desert land.[1] The territory was colonized by Spain, instead of France like other countries in the Maghreb region, in 1884. During the pan-Maghreb or the pan-Arab movement in the 1950s, the Sahrawi also joined the resistance against colonial powers and struggled for their independence as "Maghreb Unity". However, when Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia got their own independence as "nation-states", the "Maghrebian dream" was ended.

Figure 1. List of the countries which have recognized SADR

■ the countries which recognized SADR as a state (some of them have cancelled)
Source: Referring the Web Page of ARSO, the author described into the map[2]

When Spain ended its colonial regime over Western Sahara in 1975, it was "re-covered" by Moroccan-Mauritanian joint control against the Sahrawi's will.[3]   Since this time, many Sahrawi have been displaced to a refugee camp in Tindouf, Algeria. Through the

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[1] UN Data: (30th of June, 2013): http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=Western Sahara
[2] ARSO is (29th of June, 2013): http://www.arso.org/03-2.htm
[3] Mauritania withdrew from Western Sahara in 1979, and they recognized SADR. At the same time, Morocco occupied the whole territory including the one third of the southern zone which Mauritania had been ruling since 1975.

leadership of El-Ouali Mustapha Said, this Sahrawi group established the Sahara Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) in 1976 –which is recognized as a "state" by more than 80 countries in the world (the countries which have cancelled are also included) (Figure 1) and also a member of the African Union (AU) since 1981. On the other hand, the others have to remain under Moroccan authority in the region.

　　While Morocco and the Polisario[4] engaged in armed conflict, Morocco completed its control of 85 per cent of the Western Sahara territory and built a defensive sand and stone berm around the territory by 1981 (Zartman, 2007: 178). The bulk of the mines are also buried along the berm, which comprises one of the longest uninterrupted minefields in the world today.[5] As a result of the berm, Western Sahara is divided into Moroccan and Polisario controlled zones (Figure 2).

Figure 2. Moroccan Controlled zone and Polisario Controlled zone "Liberated zone"

Source: Journal of Mine Action[6]

　　After the cease-fire in 1991, the Security Council set up a UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) to mandate a referendum for a final status of

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[4] "The Polisario Front" (the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el Hamra y Río de Oro) was born in Western Sahara with the hands of a Sahrawi leader, El-Ouali Mustapha Said, and his associates on 10th of May 1973. The Polisario struggles to recover total liberty of Western Sahara.
[5] The Journal of Mine Action (2/7/2013): http://maic.jmu.edu/journal/11.2/profiles/mccoull/mccoull.htm
[6] *Ibid.*

Western Sahara in the name of the right of self-determination for the Sahrawi people.[7] Firstly, the Identification Commission of MINURSO made a list of 70,204 prospective voters based on the 1974 Spanish census in Western Sahara. In response, Moroccan authorities sought to alter the composition of the voter pool by moving thousands of Moroccan citizens (some of them could be Sahrawis who were displaced during the conflict or even during the anti-colonial struggle) to Western Sahara and asking their voting applications to the Commission (Zoubir & Pazzanita, 1995: 618). This event made it much more complicated to figure out "who is Sahrawi?" and "who has a right to vote?" Furthermore, even though James Baker, who was appointed as personal envoy of the secretary-general in March 1997 to conciliate the two parties, suggested several peace plans,[8] including the third option as an autonomy plan under Moroccan regime, Morocco and the Polisario could not reach a final agreement. As a result of the voter identification issue and disagreement of the vote condition, the referendum has still not been carried out.

The territories are also a rich repository of natural resources, for example one of the biggest amount of phosphate in the world and offshore. At the same time, it is well known about the possibility of oil and natural gas exploitation. Not only the economic interest, but also the political reason –Moroccan nationalism is based on the "myth" of "re-covering" the lost territory "Moroccan Sahara" (Western Sahara)– it is not easy for the Moroccan government to compromise for a solution. Furthermore, because of geo-political interest for the superpower states, particularly the United States and France, Morocco has continued the occupation without strong pressure from international community. Though it has been more than 35 years since the Sahrawi's diaspora, the situation has not changed and Western Sahara still remains as "the last colony" in Africa.

2. Research motivation

It was 2005 when I visited Morocco for the first time. I was impressed by the great

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[7] According to chapter 5 of the UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV), "[i]mmediate steps shall be taken, in Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories or all other territories which have not yet attained independence, to transfer all powers to the peoples of those territories, without any conditions or reservations, in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire, without any distinction as to race, creed or colour, in order to enable them to enjoy complete independence and freedom". United Nations Webpage (6/7/2013): http://www.un.org/en/decolonization/declaration.shtml The right of self-determination of Sahrawi is recognized since 1963.

[8] "Baker Plan I" was made in 2001 which proposed a period of several years of autonomy of the Western Sahara under provisions of Moroccan sovereignty. It was rejected by Algeria and the Polisario. Then, The Security Council unanimous decision (resolution 1495, July in 2003) was reached with the "Baker Plan II" which was surprisingly accepted by the Polisario; however, Moroccan side refused because they feared the result of the referendum (Shelly, 2003). In an attempt of evading the plan, Morocco presented in December 2003 a project for the creation of the "Autonomous Region of Sahara" which is the first project of autonomy that Morocco has officially presented. At the time, Baker was resigned from the project (Miguel, 2006: 1).

nature of Atlas which gives various colors in the field, beautiful mosaic art at the very traditional designed mosque, warm hospitality from the local people and children's bright eyes just like the sun in Maghreb. While discovering Moroccan attractions as a tourist, I also encountered the "Moroccan map" which is very different from what I had seen in other places. Figure 3 is the one commonly used in the world. It is issued by the United Nations. On the other hand, figure 4 is the one which the Moroccan authorities have issued. There is no border between Morocco and Western Sahara on the map. Not only has the United Nations listed Western Sahara as a non-self-governing territory,[9] but also no single state in the world has recognized Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara so far. Thus, how could the border disappear in the Moroccan map? I was surprised because I believed the world map should be the same everywhere in the world. Is it possible to have different border lines? How can it happen? These questions from the map gave me an interest to know about the meaning of the border between Morocco and Western Sahara.

Figure 3. Moroccan map by United Nations   Figure 4. Moroccan map by Moroccan authority

Source: UN Data[10]   Source: Kingdom of Morocco[11]

3. Research Question

According to the reasons above, I began to research on the Western Sahara issue, particularly to know what the problem is. I focused on the causes and features of the Western Sahara problem from the historical background, regional (Maghreb area) and international

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9 The United Nations and Decolonization (1st of July, 2013):
http://www.un.org/en/decolonization/nonselfgovterritories.shtml
10 UN Data (30 of June, 2013): http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=MOROCCO
11 Kingdom of Morocco (1/7/2013): http://www.maroc.ma/en/content/map-morocco#

geo-political aspects, international law status and internal socio-political condition of Morocco. It shows the complicated character of the Western Sahara issue. After the Madrid Accords,[12] the Sahrawi were faced with "ethnic diaspora". Almost 50,000 Sahrawi crossed the border for Tindouf in the southwestern Algeria, and the others remained in Western Sahara with Moroccan rule. After 38 years of diaspora it seems that the opinions about the issue, particularly the future status of the territory, vary considerably amongst the Sahrawi. Not all of them agree with total independence, some might be able to accept autonomy under the Moroccan authority as a solution. At this point, I could say that a new political division within the ethnic group has emerged.

Now I must focus on what "national" and "ethnic" identities are. Who is Sahrawi? Who is Moroccan? During my last fieldwork, I encountered an interesting conversation with a man from SADR. I told him that I heard some Sahrawi, who live in Laayoune,[13] are ready to accept autonomy solution under Moroccan sovereignty. The man was disappointed and said "do they become Moroccans?" His reaction has an interesting point. For him, if the Sahrawi accept the autonomy solution, the person is no longer Sahrawi. Needless to say, whether the Sahrawi accepts it or not, he/she is still "ethnically" Sahrawi. But he/she might not be seen as Sahrawi by others due to his/her political opinions, because the others might think he/she breaks faith with the Sahrawi's "national" goal as independence. Is it possible to say that one's political opinion could change its "national" identity? If the answer were yes, what is the cause to shift one's "national" identity? This is the point which I want to figure out with the case of the Western Sahara problem in this thesis.

4. Who is Sahrawi?

Before I go to the discussion, it is important to understand the history of the Sahrawi people. Archaeologists have found depicted animals in Neolithic rock drawings in Western Sahara. It is estimated to have been drawn between 5000 and 2500 B.C. by people who are known as Bafour (Hodges, 1983a: 3). During the course of the first millennium B.C., Tamazight nomads came to Western Sahara from the north and started to control the remnants of Bafour. After the first Arab expeditions to the Maghreb region, some of the Tamazight were converted to Islam (Hodges, 1983a: 4). Though very few Arabs had settled in the Maghreb in the seventh century, a series of invasions by Arab Bedouin in the thirteen century brought many settlers. One of them, Benī Hassan from Yemen, began migrating southward into the

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[12] Spain decided to abandon Western Sahara and it was divided by Morocco (two-third of the northern territory) and Mauritania (one-third of the southern territory). These three states agreed with the Accords in 1975 just before the death of General Francisco Franco.
[13] Laayoune is the capital city of Western Sahara. It is economically and administratively controlled by Moroccan authority and it has 95 per cent of the whole population of the province, 241,045 in 2010. Royaume du Maroc Ministére de la Santé (3/5/2013): http://www.sante.gov.ma/

Western Sahara in about the end of the thirteen century (Hodges, 1983a: 8). Above all, the Sahrawi have ancestors from Bafour, Tamazigh and Arab. Since their language, *Hassaniya,* has similarity with Arabic dialect in Yemen, it is believed Benī Hassan gave linguistic influence to the Sahrawi (Pazzanita, 2006: 200).

The Sahrawi are mainly composed of three clans. *Tekna* which has a strong admixture of *Tamazigh* blood live in the north, the largest Western Sahara clan, *Reguibat*, can be seen in the east, and *Maqil* who are considered as ancestors of Benī Hassan live in the coast (figure 5). Traditionally, each clan and sub-clan regulated its affairs through *djemaa* (traditional assembly), which consisted of the heads of its most distinguished families. *Djemaa* has often been called into session in time of war or grave crisis to discuss the defense or raid (Hodges, 1983: 14). Particularly in the inland where the Reguibat live, conflicts have occurred often due to scarce resources and harsh conditions of the nature.[14] At the time, *Djemaa* had a central role to mediate issues between clans. It has important "political" role in the Sahrawi society.

Figure 5. Clans in Western Sahara

Source: Referring Eya (1986: 45).

How can "Sahrawi" be defined? In *Darija* (Maghreb dialect), Sahrawi means "people

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[14] The average annual rainfall is 30 to 50mm in the nomadic land, and it is only 10 to 30mm further inland. Moreover, temperature has a large variation, it could quickly fall to below zero at night, but also be 60 degrees in the day (Rezette, 1975: 26).

who are from desert (Sahara)". It is used in the same way as "Marrakechi" (people who are from Marrakech). The "I" at the end of the word gives meaning of "people who are from". Thus, when people use the word "Sahrawi", they are not conscious of the borders in the Sahara region. Hassaniya is the language which is largely used in the Sahrawi society. It is considered unintelligible to the Moroccan, Egyptian or Eastern Arabic on the first contact, but "closer investigation this desert dialect is a "purer" brand of Arabic than most outside Arabs suspect" (Eagleton, 1965: 46). Due to the nomadic style of life, most of the Sahrawi seasonably move a long distance to follow their herds. Thus, Hassaniya is used in a wide scope; most of the places in Mauritania, the northern part of Mali, southwestern Algeria and the south of Morocco. Although the common linguistic community, same life style as nomads and traditional culture are pointed out in the above desert area, there is not a common political fate. Therefore, it is difficult to say the Hassaniya population is an ethnic community.

However, as I will mention later in this paper, some ethnic communities are created by the colonial border. Here I just make sure that whenever I use the term "Sahrawi" in this thesis, it indicates the people who speak Hassaniya or wear their traditional clothes (*Melhfa* and *Dara*), or even identified themselves as Sahrawi, in addition to these conditions, the people who are living or lived in both the southern part of Morocco and Western Sahara territory, including in Tindouf. It means I focus on the Sahrawi population who was under Spanish colonial rule. Of course, I cannot ignore the fact that 80 per cent of the Mauritanian population also speaks Hassaniya (Eagleton, 1965: 46), and there are some Sahrawi who speak Tamazight instead of Hassaniya in the southern part of Morocco.[15] Hence, the ethnic boundary which I defined above has fuzzy character.

5. Morocco as a multi-ethnic country

Morocco has a constructed "Moroccan national identity" within the border where various ethnic groups co-exist; the descendants of Arab invaders of the eighth century and also of migrating Arab tribes of the later Middle Ages, Jews from a lost Andalusia, significant number of *Tamazight*[16] population (Berber) and Sahrawi in the south (Cline, 1947: 18). After Moroccan independence in 1956, state-elite or nationalist has seen ethnic criteria as irrelevant, and all Moroccans being equal (Venema & Mguild, 2010: 36). Furthermore, King Mohammed VI stated in his annual speech on 30 July 2001 that "national Moroccan identity is based on a pluralistic ethnic, cultural and linguistic reality." (Venema & Mguild, 2010: 37). Thus, it is

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[15] There are some Sahrawi who wear their traditional clothes but they do not speak Hassaniya in the south of Morocco, particularly Sidi Ifni region. They speak Tamazight instead.
[16] *Tamazight* is a plural form of *amazight* which means "freedom person" in their language. "Berber" is named by Arab or Roman and which has comes from "*barbar* (uncivilized people)" in Greek (Ishihara & Shinkai, 2006: 10). Since Tamazight call themselves "Tamazight", I prefer to use this way in the paper.

clear that the Moroccan authority has been conscious of the importance of equality amongst the ethnic groups.

Due to the multi-ethnic character, the spoken language also has variety. Though Arabic language has dominated the public space, almost half of the whole population understands Arabic and Tamazight language at the same time (Ishihara & Shinkai, 2006: 12).[17] Because of a radical reformulation (Arabization) of both governmental language policies and state-society relations, Tamazight has been discriminated in the public sphere for a long time. At the same time, the integration between Arab and Tamazigh is highly advanced in the urban area. Most of the young Tamazight generation no longer speaks their parent's language. Since Mohamed VI assumed the throne in 1999, he has made preliminary moves towards reversing this discrimination. He introduced Tamazight language into public spheres and also founded the state-sponsored Moroccan Royal Institute for Amazigh Culture (IRCAM) in 2005 (Hoffman, 2006: 146). Despite the above ethnic difference, Tamazight and Arab can co-exist within the Moroccan "nation-state" boundary through common religious loyalty.

Also, I should point out the existence of the Jewish community which has a different religious identity. According to Daniel Schroeter, after World War II, approximately 250,000-270,000 Jews were living in Morocco. They are considered the first non-Tamazight people who came to the Maghrib before Arab, and also the large number of Jews from the Iberian Peninsula occurred during the Christian Reconquista period. In Moroccan national discourse, "Jews are a vital and integral component of the Moroccan nation" (Schroeter, 2008: 147). Under the sultan rule, the Jewish community is protected as a non-Muslim population. Furthermore, the historical relation between Muslims and Jews in Morocco gives diplomatic influence between Morocco and Israel. About 230,000 Jews are estimated to have moved from Morocco to Israel between 1948 and 1964, which makes up 14 per cent of the population of Israel at the time. Also since five of eight ministers from Muslim states in Israel in 1988 were originally from Morocco, they might have strong political influence in the state (Wigoder, 1994: 949-950). Due to the strong Moroccan-Jewish ties, King Hassan II mediated to reach the peace agreement of Camp David between Egypt and Israel. As we see here, despite religious difference, Moroccans and Jews are politically united in Moroccan society.

Above all, Morocco is characterized as a multi-ethnic state. Thus they have tried to overcome ethnic and religious differences within the border and create a Moroccan national identity.

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[17] In addition to the linguistic difference between Arabic and Tamazight, the latter has three different dialect groups; Tarifit in Rif region, Tamazigt in the Middle Atlas, Tashelht in Sous region, High Atlas and Anti-Atlas. It is almost not possible to communicate with other dialects, since they have been developed with unique ways in each region.

6. The Sahrawi Refugee Camp in Tindouf

The Sahrawi refugee camp was built in 1975 in Tindouf, southwestern Algeria. At the time, the Moroccan army invaded Western Sahara and the Sahrawi population of the territory refuged to cross the border. By the end of 1975, approximately 40 per cent of the population in the Western Sahara, between 40,000 and 70,000 Sahrawi, had become refugees in Tindouf (Farah, 2012: 32). According to the UNHCR data in 2013, the actual number of the refugee in the camp is estimated to 116,452.[18] Due to the harsh condition of the desert –the temperature hover around 50 degrees Celsius in the summer and it could be below zero during winter nights– Tindouf area is not propitious for either animal husbandry or agriculture on a scale which could provide more than a small fraction of the refugees' food needs (Hodges, 1983a: 233). Thus, their daily necessities are largely depended on the international humanitarian aids.

Despite the difficult condition, SADR has not wasted any time for "nation-building". The authorities fostered self-management rule in the camp. The camp is composed of provinces (*wilayaat*); Laayoune, Smara, Dakhla, Auserd, each one is subdivided into six or seven district (*dawa'er*) and also each district is divided into around four neighborhoods (*hayy*) (Farah, 2012: 33). Furthermore, each adult refugee is part of a"cell" where they discuss about the policy of the Polisario. At the same time, the public social system has been highly constructed. Each local committee provides education, health, food, justice, and production projects. As a result of its effort, the literacy rate reached 90 per cent in 2005, compared 5 per cent in 1975 (Oleynik, 2005: 27) and also more than 60 per cent of Sahrawi women who are educated in the camp are working in health and education system (Lakhal, 2012: 50). While international humanitarian aid and its concern on the issue are decreased, Sahrawi refugees are not only waiting for a solution, but also constructing their future "nation-state".

7. Western Sahara and "Moroccan Sahara"

Western Sahara was known as "Spanish Sahara" in the time of Spanish colonization. After Spain abandoned the territory in 1975, it has been called "Western Sahara" in the international society, including the United Nations. However, in Morocco, it also has been named as "Moroccan Sahara". The names show the political status of the Western Sahara issue.

This thesis is not going to decide which name is right or wrong. Each person has an opinion of the issue and it is also created by his/her own education or historical background. The important thing here is how the person reaches the idea. In the international political stage, no state recognizes Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara. On the other hand, most Moroccan citizens believe they "re-covered" the territory, not "occupied" it. The

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[18] UNHCR webpage (24/7/2013): http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e4861f6.html

difference between international and Moroccan recognition come from which fact or ethno-history they focus on when they consider the issue. Thus, as long as we judge one's recognition with viewed right or wrong, the discussion will not go forward. In this paper, I will try to describe the individual opinion without considering its justification.

8. Arabic Transcription

It often creates confusion when we transcribe one language to a different one. In this thesis, I have to write some Arabic words into Alphabet letters. Taking into consideration *Darija* (Maghreb Arabic dialect),[19] I basically refer the transcript style of Abdellah Cherkayri (Cherkayri, 2011). The transcription letter will be written as below. However, some names are written by general English forms, for example, Laayoune, Tindouf and personal name.

Transcription	Arabic script	Transcription	Arabic script
a/ā	ا	b	ب
t	ت	th/t*	ث
j	ج	H	ح
kh	خ	d	د
dh/d*	ذ	r	ر
z	ز	s	س
sh/ch	ش	S	ص
D	ض	Dh/D*	ظ
T	ط	'	ع
gh	غ	f	ف
q	ق	k	ك
l	ل	m	م
n	ن	h	ه
w/ū	و	y/ī	ي

*The three consonants ذ, ث and ظ are pronounced in *Darija* as d, t and D, instead of dh, th and Dh in *fuSHā* (Standard Arabic) (Cherkayri, 2011 xxv).

9. Brief Description of the thesis

The thesis is composed of six chapters. As I have already discussed here, I make

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[19] *Darija* is often translated into Moroccan Arabic dialect which has significant influence from *Tamazight* language; however Algerian dialect is also considered as *Darija* (Droua-Hamdani, Selouani and Boudraa, 2010: 158) Thus, I use *Darija* as broader meaning, Maghreb Arabic dialect.

clear the purpose of the paper; to investigate Sahrawi national identity and political opinion toward the Western Sahara problem, and the definition of the some key words, like Sahrawi and Western Sahara in chapter one. In the next chapter, I will explain the complicated character of the Western Sahara problem, including the Spanish colonial history, international legal aspects related to the right of Sahrawi self-determination and the Advisory Opinion by ICJ, geo-political interests from the great powers during the cold war and the role of the United Nations. After clarifying the character of the problem, I move on to explain the theoretical framework which I use in this paper. I will focus on national identity theory by Anthony Smith "*National Identity* (1991)". Before going into the theoretical argument, I will define the key words, like *ethnie*, nation and state. Based on these definitions, the character of national identity and its transformation process are presented in the third chapter.

Then, the discussion goes to the methodological section in the fourth chapter. The method which I used in my fieldwork is mainly individual interviewing and focus group interviewing. After explaining the definition and uses of interview method, I discuss interview discourse, particularly the process of recontexualization and re-presentation. At the same time, I explain the detail of my fieldwork, for example, the location, the method of recruiting informants, and the contents of the interview discussion. In chapter five, I will analyze the interview data, with referring the relation between passport and national identity, the meaning of traditional clothes and ethnic identity, and a dilemma in the Sahrawi national unity. Finally, based on the theory and analysis, I will discuss the main theme which is if political opinion can change one's national identity or not, and if so, what is the cause to shift one's national identity? With the answer to three questions, in the final chapter, I conclude this paper with the discussion about a possibility to create a society of peaceful co-existence in the Maghreb region through the mechanism of national identity transformation.

Fish market in Sidi Ifini

Chapter 2. What is the Western Sahara Problem? –Its Historical Background and the Complicated Aspects of the Issue-

What is the Western Sahara problem? Why are the Sahrawi still struggling for their independence in the middle of the great desert? We must know how this problem occurred and what the causes are. We will discuss the brief historical background from the end of the 19th century -when Spain colonized Western Sahara territory- to 1975 -when Western Sahara was "recovered" by Morocco and Mauritania. Secondly, we will consider the Western Sahara problem in relation to international legal aspect. Particularly, we will focus on the priorities of self-determination and territorial integrity. Then we will examine the complicated character of the problem, for example, the geopolitical issues in the Maghreb region, the great power influence during the cold war period and its economic interests. At the end of this chapter, we will consider the current situation of the Sahrawi and the role of the United Nations.

2.1. Background of the Western Sahara Problem: Brief History of the Spanish Colonial Time

Western Sahara was colonized by Spain, rather than France which colonized most of the Maghreb region (The northern part of Morocco and Ifni were also colonized by Spain). Why was Spain eager to obtain exactly this territory? Furthermore, what was the purpose to continue colonial rule there after the ending of the other colonies? We will briefly discuss the Spanish colonial history of Western Sahara in this section.

1492, this is one of the most remarkable years for Spanish history. There were two historical events that happened in this year. One is the success of *Reconquista* (the Christian movement which tried to retake the Iberian Peninsula from the Moors), which leads to the ending of the Islamic rule. The other is the "discovery" of the new continent by Christopher Columbus. After these two events, Spain had obtained their "Golden Age" by starting imperial domination in the world. In short, the Western countries opened the door of colonization in 1492.

There is not enough space to present in detail of the Spanish colonial history here. If we just focus on the topic of the Western Sahara, the important fact is that Spain no longer had strong power as an imperial country when the Conference of Berlin was held in 1885. In this conference, European countries, mainly England and France, divided the African continent as they wish, then, needless to say, the line which was made by colonial powers did not consider local situations, for example, ethnic boundaries. These artificial borders have become causes for many conflicts in Africa, even now. Anyway, according to the result of the Conference of Berlin, France obtained the rule of most of the Maghreb region (France officially colonized Algeria in 1830, Tunisia in 1881 and Morocco in 1912). However, France

had to share the rule of the region with Spain which colonized Rif (the northern part of Morocco), Ifni (the southern part of Morocco) and Western Sahara (which is located just in front of the Spanish last key point, the Canaries Islands) (Figure 6).

Figure 6. Spanish Morocco and Sahara, and "Greater Morocco"

Source: Mundy, J. (2006) "Neutrality or complicity? The United States and the 1975 Moroccan takeover of the Spanish Sahara, *The Journal of North African Studies,* Vol. 11 (3), USA: The American Institute for Maghreb Studies and the Centre of North Africa Studies, pp.280.

Why does France allow Spain to dominate part of the Maghreb region? The answer is related to the power balance between England and France. England established a trade company "the North West African Company"[20] in Tarfaya (the Southern Morocco) in 1879, and it was looking for the opportunity to gain rule in the region. This British strategy made France uneasy about the issue of regional domination. After the discussion between these two imperial powers, they reached the conclusion of *the Entente Cordiale* in 1904 –France admitted British rule in Egypt, and on the other hand, England withdrew from Tarfaya. At the same time, they agreed with the condition that France has to accept Spanish rule in the Rif region due to the British security of Gibraltar (Hodegs, 1983a: 47). For Spain, it was the last

[20] On March 13, 1895, Britain and Morocco (Sultan) signed an agreement by which the sultan purchased the trading station of the company at Tarfaya for £50,000 and Britain recognized Moroccan sovereignty over the lands that are between Wad Draa and Cape Bojador (Hodges, 1983a: 36).

chance to obtain colonies in Africa after losing all of their colonies in Latin America. Furthermore, Spain dispatched Emilio Bounelli (from *the Sociedad de Africanistas y Colonistas*) to Western Sahara for protecting their last bastion, Canary Islands. In 1884, Spain colonized Western Sahara by the result of the treaty which was signed by a *sorba* of Ould Bou Sb'a (one of the local clans).[21] Here, the artificial boundary was established between Morocco and Western Sahara.[22]

However, Spain took time to control the new colony. Once Spanish army lost the battle against the native force (which was led by Muhammed bin 'Abd al-Karim Al-Khattai) in Rif,[23] it created confusion in the internal political role. King Alfonso XIII and the government were accused of defeat by its opposition. Furthermore, the situation made clear the confrontation between *"Africanista"*[24] and Republican loyalist force. This internal confusion led to *coups d'etat* in Rif by the Africanista in 1936 and resulted in the Spanish Civil War. Eventually, Franco won the war with the support from the Africanista and Berber military unit. In the same way as this victory, Franco could sustain his 40 years of leadership of the country.

After the civil war, the Rif region was handed to the Moroccan authorities when it obtained independence in 1956. The small enclave, Ifni was also integrated to Morocco in 1968, at the same time as Republic of Equatorial Guinea received independence from Spain. On the other hand, Spain had increased their investment to Western Sahara. Why was Spain attached to Western Sahara?

There are three answers to this question. Firstly, we can definitely indicate the various kinds of natural resources in Western Sahara. Not only the rich fishing ground along the coast, but also the oil exploration holds the attention of foreign investment. More than 40 concessions, covering around 100,000 sq km (two-fifths of the territory's total land-area), were awarded to 11 consortia, involving 19 oil companies between 1960 and 1964.[25] Furthermore, we must note phosphate which was already discovered in the 1940s. The

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[21] *Sobra* is a negotiating party to resolve conflict between tribes in Western Sahara (Hodges, 1983a: 12). Bonelli was fluent in Arabic and so found it easy to contact with local tribes. He suggested to them that Spanish trading posts could be established at the Río de Oro, Cape Blanc and Angra de Cintra, a bay about fifty miles south of the rip of the Dakhla Peninsula (most of the coast of Western Sahara). Due to the commercial consideration, a sorba of the Oulad Bou Sbaa signed a fateful treaty with Bonelli on November 28, 1884 (Hodges, 1983a: 42).

[22] Franco-Spanish negotiations, about the border line between Morocco and Western Sahara, began in 1900. On November 12, 1912, the final convention had finally accepted and drawn the border. According to this convention, a protectorate zone, known as Spanish Southern Morocco, existed between the Wad Draa and parallel 27º40' which considered as a Spanish's protectorate zone in Morocco, instead of a Spanish colony (Hodges, 1983a: 48).

[23] The Rif War ended in 1926 after six years resistance to the Spanish occupation. The liberation movement had inflicted serious defeats on the Spanish force in 1921 and 1924. These blows to European pride had led to crush the resistance by Spanish-French co-operative military attack (Pennell, 1996: 234).

[24] Army of Africa which was lead by Francisco Franco later is known as *Africanista*.

[25] By 1964 a total of 27 discoveries had made. However, because of the territory's inadequate infrastructure and the low world oil prices at the time, no oil was exploited (Hodge, 1983: 33).

Spanish state's *Instituto Nacional de Industria* (INI) set up the *Empresa Nacional Minera del Sahara* (ENMINSA) to examine the feasibility of exploiting phosphates in 1962. ENMINSA soon presented that Western Sahara had 10 billion tons of phosphates and there was a proven reserve of 1.7 billion tons of very high-grade ore at Bou Krā'a (Hodges, 1983b: 33). In 1969, *Fosfates de Bou Krā'a* (Fosbucraa) was founded to exploit the deposits and Spanish government had invested 24.5 billion peseta for the project there by 1974 (Table 1 shows Morocco and Western Sahara have the biggest reserves in the world). At the time, Western Sahara became the world's sixth-largest phosphate exporter. If the project had been continued, Western Sahara seemed destined to become the world's second major exporter by 1980 (Hodges, 1983b: 34). It is very clear that the Spanish authorities had large economic interests in Western Sahara.

Table 1. World Phosphate Mine Reserves and Production in 2007 and 2008 (Unit: tons)

	Reserves	Mine production	
		2007	2008
Morocco & Western Sahara*	5,700,000	27,000	28,000
China	4,100,000	45,400	50,000
South Africa	1,500,000	2,560	2,400
United States	1,200,000	29,700	30,900
Jordan	900,000	5,540	5,500

*Since Moroccan authority has controlled over Western Sahara, there is no divided data between Morocco and Western Sahara. The production of Western Sahara itself is estimated around 1.5 Mt in 2008.[26]

Source: U.S. Geological Survey[27]

Second, we can point out the secession movement in Spain. General Franco had been faced with an anti-establishment movement in the 1950s and 1960s. Particularly, "Basque Homeland and Freedom (ETA)" was established in 1959. They were strongly against the Castilian nationalism policy by Franco and claimed their own Basque nationalism (Spencer & Croucher, 2008: 138).[28] Due to Franco's suppression, they began to seek for secession from Spain. ETA was not an exception. Their movement shared the common goal with Catalan nationalist. Thus, the Spanish authorities were afraid of influence from the Western Sahara's

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[26] USGS Webpage (01/03/2013): http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/country/2001/momyb01.pdf
[27] USGS Webpage (01/03/2013):
http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/phosphate_rock/mcs-2009-phosp.pdf
[28] Basque identity, patriotism and language have been intertwined since the repressive language policies of General Franco. The Basque and other minority-languages in the nation were not allowed to be spoken or be taught in schools or media. Expression such as "Spain" or cheers of "Viva España" was used by Franco to establish Spanish nationalism (Spencer & Croucher, 2008: 138).

independence could spill over to the Basque or Catalan secession movements.

Finally, we must mention the character of Franco authority itself. As we already have discussed, Franco was supported by his colleagues, Africanista, who fought together in African colony. He could not easily give up from the territories which Africanista were eager to maintain. At the same time, it might be his pride as a Colonel of the Spanish Foreign Legion to hold on to the last colony in Africa. Indeed, Franco had a plan to lead Western Sahara to independence through establishing a puppet regime, instead of "recovering" by Morocco. Not only Colonel Eduardo Blanco Rodríguez (the man put in charge of Franco's plan to guide to independence), but also the officials serving in the Sahara were sympathetic to Polisario and hoped to complete the colonial mission with honor (Mundy, 2006: 290).

Although there were various reasons to maintain Western Sahara under Spanish control, neither the international nor the domestic situation allowed Spain to keep the status-quo any more. In 1974, Spain finally announced its intention to hold a self-determination referendum by July 1975, after increasing international pressure for de-colonization. Furthermore, after forty years of leadership of the country, when General Franco's death was close, Spain decided to leave the territory by its declaration of May 23. The Spanish authorities were unwilling to involve itself in a foreign conflict while a domestic political crisis loomed in front. Considering the unstable Spanish political situation as a good opportunity to "recover" the territory, King Hassan II announced the "Green March"[29] (See Chapter 3) on the radio and television in October 16, 1975 (Weiner, 1979: 20). Eventually, the March succeeded as the King planned and the Tripartite Agreement of November 14, 1975 (the Madrid Accord) was signed by Spain, Morocco and Mauritania one week before Franco's death (Weiner, 1979:29). With the Accord, Western Sahara has been divided and re-occupied by Morocco and Mauritania. Polisario sought refuge from the Moroccan military force to Tindouf, in southwestern Algeria, and established the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) in February 1976. Therefore, the Spanish role was "officially" ended here. In other words, the de-colonization problem, at this point, was transformed to a more complicated regional political issue; "The Western Sahara Problem".

As we see here, Western Sahara has been through a different colonial experience from other Maghreb states. When it comes to the decolonization process, this division becomes further clear. Not only could Western Sahara not reach independence at the time as other Maghreb "nation-states" were born, but also it encountered new controlling powers and could not liberate the territory. It is because Spain had economic interest in the territory, and at the same time, its domestic socio-political conditions did not allow Western Sahara to obtain independence. Likewise, Morocco has almost the same reasons –economic interests

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[29] King Hassan II called for 350,000 unarmed volunteers to cross the border of Western Sahara to claim Morocco's sovereignty there. The detail is discussed in the chapter 3 (Weiner, 1979: 20).

and domestic socio-political situation– to "recover" the territory. In 1975, as a result of matching both Spanish and Moroccan interests, Western Sahara was transferred to Morocco (and Mauritania) from Spain by the Madrid Accord, without considering the will of the Sahrawi.

2.2. The International Legal Aspect: The Advisory Opinion by the ICJ in 1975

The Green March was activated right after the decision of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The ICJ rendered the advisory opinion on the decolonization dispute of Western Sahara on October 16, 1975. It is understood as an international legal aspect of the issue. What is the consequence of the advisory opinion? What are the causes to promote the Moroccan government to conduct the Green March? Here we must discuss the legal precedence over the right of self-determination and the territorial integrity which are the key points of the advisory opinion.

We should consider the Declaration of the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (the United Nations General Assembly of Resolution 1514). [30] Paragraph 2 of the Declaration states that "[a]ll peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development." This provision grants peoples to make a free choice for their future political status; for example, to form an independent state, to associate with an existing state, or to be incorporated into an existing state. Nevertheless, paragraph 6 of the Declaration provides that "[a]ny attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations." This paragraph examines the relationship between the principles of self-determination and territorial integrity in the decolonization process (Blay, 1986: 442). Former colonies, using paragraph 6, claim to recover their "lost territory" after its independence. At the same time, this claim of historical right clashed with the right of self-determination of the peoples who live in the "lost territory". Does the right of self-determination take precedence over the right of territorial integrity or vice versa?

It is interesting that the decisions of the ICJ do not have a fixed-form in the cases related to the right of self-determination and the territorial integrity. For example, Goa was a Portuguese enclave located in India. India's claim –Goa was taken from the Indian Union on the eve of colonization- was justified on the grounds of the pre-colonial Indian entity and Goa was integrated to India (Blay, 1986: 466). On the other hand, Indonesia was denied their historical claim to East Timor. Indonesia claimed the principle of territorial integrity and justified its annexation of East Timor. However, the Security Council condemned the

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[30] UNHCR Webpage (06/02/2013): http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/independence.htm

Indonesian invasion[31] and affirmed the inalienable right of the people of East Timor to self-determination (Blay, 1986: 456).

Above all, it is not crystal clear that the right of self-determination takes precedence over the territorial integrity. The right of self-determination, as the paragraph 2 shows, applies to all "peoples"[32] which must consist of a "unit". According to Takanobu Kiriyama, this "unit" is considered as the group which is made by colonial rule in the decolonization context (Kiriyama, 1985).[33] Michael M. Gunter also discusses that "whether a people may or may not exercise a right to self-determination becomes dependent largely on the accidents and arbitrariness of their colonial past (Gunter, 1974: 152)". In other words, although some authorities had historical "sovereignty" rights from the pre-colonial period, it would be damaged by the colonial "unit". As a matter of fact, Western Sahara was controlled by Spain (which was a different "unit" from Morocco under French rule); therefore, the United Nation General Assembly of Resolution 2711 decreed the right of the peoples of Western Sahara to self-determination and called on Spain to conduct a referendum.[34] However, since Morocco and Mauritania claimed the territory with the right of historical entity, the decolonization problem does not go in a simple direction. Then the United Nation General Assembly of Resolution 3292 led to request for an advisory opinion from the ICJ on certain problems relating to the decolonization of Western Sahara.[35]

Now we see the contents of the advisory opinion. There are two questions which are asked by the Resolution 3292:

I. Was Western Sahara (Rio de Oro and Sakiet el Hamra), at the time of colonization by Spain, a territory belonging to no one (*terra nullius*)?

If the answer to the first question is in the negative;

II. What were the legal ties between this territory and the Kingdom of Morocco and the Mauritanian entity?[36]

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[31] There are three political parties emerged in the former Portuguese colony of East Timor. The União Democrática Timorense (UDT) favored the presence of Portugal, The Frente Revolucináaria de Timor Leste Independente (FRETILIN) advocated independence, and The Associação Popular Democrática de Timor (APODETI) supported integration with Indonesia. As a result of parties' confliction, with the assistance of Indonesian troops, UDT and APODETI established a Provisional Government in East Timor (Blay, 1986: 455).

[32] "Peoples" is understood, in the Charter of United Nation, as the political legal sense of a state. However the terms "peoples" and "nations" were not made absolutely clear in the Charter who had the right of self-determination. In fact, self-determination had become a right to be exercised by the peoples as a whole who inhabited a given colonial entity. In other words, it had little practical application for those who inhabited the non-colonial areas (to avoid secession) (Gunter, 1974: 150-152).

[33] There are three meaning of "self-determination of peoples": 1) the right of colonial peoples to become a state; 2) the right of minorities of a state to become an autonomous state; 3) the right of ethnic minorities to benefit from certain collective rights (Archibugi, 2003: 493). Here we focus on the first one.

[34] UN Home Page (11/02/2013):
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/349/76/IMG/NR034976.pdf?OpenElement

[35] UN Home Page (03/03/2013):
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/738/94/IMG/NR073894.pdf?OpenElement

[36] International Court of Justice (11/02/2013): http://www.icj-cij.org/

The court decided as below after considering the documents which were handed out by Morocco, Mauritania and Spain. For the first question, the court mentioned that Western Sahara was occupied by the consent of the inhabitants which had a social and political organization by means of a public agreement, even though colonization is usually justified with the doctrine of discovery (Tully, 2000: 54). Thus, it was concluded –voted 13 to 2– that Western Sahara was not *terra nullius* in 1884.

The next question made the issue much more complicated, due to the word "legal ties". What is the meaning for that? Paragraph 84 of the advisory opinion said "the meaning of the expression 'legal ties' in Question II has to be found rather in the object and purpose of General Assembly Resolution 3292". The object of the Resolution 3292 was to guide the further process of decolonization of the territory. Then paragraph 85 provides that "the Court cannot accept the view that the legal ties/…/were limited to ties established directly with the territory/…/ since legal ties are normally established in relation to people". According to these paragraphs, it seems that "legal ties" do not mean merely territorial sovereignty. Furthermore, paragraph 94 showed that "[n]o rule of international law/…/ requires the structure of a State to follow any particular pattern, as is evident from diversity of the forms of State found in the world today"; therefore, the ICJ justified the Moroccan claim which "the Court should take account of the special structure of the Sherifian State."

The Moroccan claim to "legal ties" is based on; 1) an alleged immemorial possession of the territory, 2) characters of Moroccan government, *makhzan*, 3) the international acts (Smith, 1977: 135-136).[37] We focus on the second question because it illustrates two aspects of the ICJ's decision. As we discussed above, Morocco claimed the special structure of the Sherifian State.[38] It means that features of the State are founded on "the common religious bound of Islam existing among the peoples and on the allegiance (*bay'a*) of various tribes to the Sultan, through their *caids* or *sheikhs*, rather than on the notion of territory (Paragraph 95)". In Islam, sovereignty is conferred by a population's *bay'a* (pledge of allegiance), given by tribal, communal or religious leaders in the name of their communities, to a sultan (Weiner, 1979: 21). On this point, the ICJ agreed that "the settled Tekna, established in southern Morocco, acknowledged their political allegiance to the Sultan" in paragraph 100. We must remember that this part of southern Morocco was under Spanish control as a protectorate zone until 1957. Thus, if we consider the colonial "unit", southern Morocco, between the Wādī

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[37] Morocco relied on the international acts; 1) certain treaties concluded with Spain, the United States, and the Great Britain between 1767 and 1861 which dealt with the safety of persons shipwrecked on the coast of Wad Noun or its vicinity; and, 2) certain bilateral treaties whereby Great Britain, Spain, France and Germany were said to have recognized that Moroccan sovereignty extended as far as Cape Bojador or the boundary of the Rio de Oro (Smith, 1977: 135).

[38] Morocco also claims their entity of Western Sahara with referring the Eastern Greenland case. In this case, the ICJ justifies historical entity of Denmark due to the continued display of authority with the unsettled population in an extreme environment. Western Sahara is thinly unpopulated great desert where nomads live with extreme condition. The population was estimated not more than 100,000 for the 102,703 square mile territory in 1979 (Weiner, 1979: 20).

Dar'a and parallel 27º40', is understood as a part of the Spanish "unit".

Finally, the ICJ concluded that rejecting Morocco's claim of sovereignty based on geographical contiguity –title of contiguity understood as a basis of territorial sovereignty (Smith, 1977: 159). Paragraph 151, however, provides that "[t]he language employed by the General Assembly in Question II does not appear to the Court to confine the question exclusively to those legal ties which imply territorial sovereignty", "legal ties" is not limited to territorial sovereignty. As a result, Morocco stretched the point –the ICJ agreed their sovereignty based on "legal ties" with allegiance (as paragraph 100 shows above), and "recovered" the Western Sahara just after the ICJ's decision. Here we can point out the ambiguous aspect of the word "legal ties" of the advisory opinion, which made confusion between the Western value of "sovereignty" and Islamic or cultural based "sovereignty", and therefore, has left some unsolved questions.

2.3. The Hegemony Dispute in the Maghreb and the Cold War: Economic Interest Versus Regional Strategy

The Western Sahara problem is deeply related to the hegemony dispute within the Maghreb region. After the Madrid Accord, Morocco started to establish its rule in Western Sahara. On the other hand, Algeria supported the right of self-determination for Sahrawi and allowed the Polisario to build a refugee camp inside their territory. Although the risk for a Maghreb regional conflict was very high in the 1970s and 1980s, it was successfully avoided. Why did the *status quo* remain? The answer can be found in the geopolitical and economic interests in the region by the super powers. We will now analyze the complicated relations between the hegemonic countries in Maghreb –Morocco and Algeria– and the super powers – the United States and the Soviet Union– during the Cold War era in this section.

Firstly, we must recognize the background of the Maghreb Union which was discussed by representatives from Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria (which was struggling for independence at the time) in Tangier in 1958. Though all of them had agreed to establish the Arab Maghreb Union after gaining their independence, they failed to achieve the plan. One of the causes of the failure was an unsolved border issue. Due to the idea of the "Greater Morocco" (Figure 6)[39], Morocco had not recognized its southeastern border with Algeria. Then it led to the conflict in the region of Tindouf in 1963, "the War of the Sands", just after

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[39] Allal el-Fassi, the principal leader of the Istiqlal Party, argued that "[i]f Morocco is independent, it is not completely unified. The Moroccans will continue the struggle until Tangier, the Sahara from Tindouf to Colomb-Bechar, Touat, Kenadza, Mauritania are liberated and unified. Our independence will only be complete with the Sahara!" in 1956. Later, his cousin 'Abd el-kebir el-Fessi drew a map of Greater Morocco, which was published in the Istiqlal Party's daily newspaper, Al-Alam (Hodges, 1983a: 85).

Algerian independence.[40] Here we must mention that the clash between Morocco and Algeria had started after building their own sovereign "nation-states".

Although the border clash showed an unstable relation between Morocco and Algeria, they had agreed on the future status of Western Sahara until 1975. At an Arab League summit in Rabat, in October 1974, Hassan II and the Mauritanian President Mohktar Ould Daddah reached an agreement to divide Western Sahara –annexing the southern third evacuated by Mauritania– with the blessings of Algerian President Houari Boumedienne (Mundy, 2006: 282). A Joint 4 July communiqué –approved by both Hassan II and Boumedienne in 1975– also shows that the Algerian government agreed not to oppose the ambition of Rabat and Nouakchott in Western Sahara, in exchange for Moroccan favor toward ratification of a 1972 Algerian-Moroccan border treaty (Mundy, 2006: 282). However, Algeria eventually opposed the plan and once again strongly supported the Sahrawi's right of self-determination before the ICJ at the end of the same month. Why did Algeria return to their first policy?

Algeria itself was a country which obtained independence through a bloody war against a colonial power -France. As a result of the struggle, Algeria built its international reputation on the revolutionary legitimacy and also its leading role within the Non-Aligned Movement in the 1970s. Thus, they stood on the point that self-determination is the path to legitimate independent statehood (Joffé, 2010: 377). On the other hand, it has often been suggested that Algeria's desire for an Atlantic port has motivated its pro-independent Sahara policy.[41] Such a port would be a cause for easy export of the iron ore at Garet Djebilet, near Tindouf (Mundy, 2006: 281). Likewise, if we consider the economic aspect, Algeria does not welcome Moroccan economic growth by obtaining one of the biggest phosphate mines at Bou Krā'a. Furthermore, Algeria is cautious about Moroccan expansionism; the idea of the Greater Morocco. We should not forget that Morocco also claims its historical right to the southwestern part of Algeria, which was not completely solved at that time. Above all, we cannot deny that Algeria regards Morocco as a regional threat.

Algeria's official position, however, has insisted that the conflict in Western Sahara is the sole responsibility of the United Nations and outside of Algerian-Moroccan bilateral relations (Zoubir & Benadballah-Gambier, 2006: 196). On the other hand, Morocco claims that the Polisario is not an indigenous movement of the people of Western Sahara but consists entirely of Algerian mercenaries; therefore the conflict is between Morocco and Algeria, not with the Polisario. Indeed, an Algerian-Moroccan war broke out in January 1976. Violent

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[40] In the early summer of 1963, Morocco claims sovereignty over part of the Algerian Sahara, then in July, both countries began military build-ups in the region of Tindouf. This led to a border conflict between the states. Fortunately, the conflict was halted thanks to the mediation of some African and Arab states. The Bamako conference of 29-30 October resulted in a ceasefire agreement which was signed on 2 November (Stora, 2007: 24).

[41] However, this point would not be concerned if we considered of the Algerian gas pipeline to Spain going through northern Morocco, which pays Rabat in free gas. According to this fact, it is possible that Algeria could gain Atlantic access through southern Morocco (Mundy, 2006: 281).

clashes took place between the two armies at Amgala, on the border city. Although the conflict ended in the middle of February, the relationship did not go in the direction of improvement. On the contrary, after the proclamation of the SADR, Algeria recognized it as the new government, and finally this led Morocco to break off diplomatic relations with their neighborhood in March. According to this fact, it is indicated that the regional hegemonic dispute between Morocco and Algeria is deeply related to the Western Sahara problem.

Next, we must discuss why this regional dispute had not led to a serious armed conflict between Morocco and Algeria, though it has twice resulted in border conflicts. The reason for this is related to regional strategies of the super powers under the Cold War. Morocco is one of the United States' oldest allies (actually, Morocco is the first country who recognized the independence of the United States of America in 1777). Since its independence, Moroccan policies have been pro-Western and heavily aligned with French and American interests in Africa and the Middle East. On the other hand, the Algerian regime has chosen the direct opposition against many of the West's Cold War policies in Africa, especially those of France and the United States. Though Algeria imported arms and became a major purchaser of the Soviet Union, it has kept its economic interests to the West (Mundy, 2006: 278). These geopolitical and economic relations between the super powers and the Maghreb region have impacts on the Western Sahara conflict.

The American influence on the agreement of the Madrid Accord is often pointed out. Jacob Mundy said that the goal for American policy toward the Western Sahara crisis in 1975 was to "help Spain get out with minimal loss of face, while facilitating international legitimization of the Moroccan takeover through the United Nations" (Mundy, 2006: 300-301). According to him, there are reasons for the United States to play a partisan role. First of all, they were highly concerned about the regional stability at the mouth of the Mediterranean. As we have already discussed above, the Spanish government was transitioning from Franco's regime at the moment. Considering the sudden April 1974 revolution in Portugal which led to a communist junta, the United States policymakers needed a smooth transition in Spain (Mundy, 2006: 277). Likewise, quoting Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, "the United States will not allow another Angola on the East flank of the Atlantic Ocean", they were cautious about Soviet influence on the Polisario after the birth of a new government (Mundy, 2006: 279). Moreover, taking the Moroccan socio-political situation into consideration,[42] the US government did not only work to tone down the United Nations Security Council resolutions (particularly, 379 and 380) condemning the Green March, but also supported   reaching a "secret agreement"[43] for the march between Spain and Morocco.

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[42] Hassan II was faced two military-led coup attempts in 1971 and 1972. Under the crisis of legitimacy, the King had to share governance with oppositions and to place tight controls over the military, undermined labor and student organizations (Mundy, 2006: 280). Also later the Moroccan unions, the Socialist Party, and the student movement have been repressed since the Casablanca riots of June 1981 (Wright, 1983: 177)
[43] They have already discussed the joint management of the phosphate mine at Bu Kra'a;

For saving face for Hassan II, the US government agreed with the agreement; "[l]et the marchers go into it ten kilometers, and let a token go all the way to [Al-'Uyun], and having done this, turn around and go back" (Mundy, 2006: 298). Therefore, Mundy concluded that the US government consistently manipulated the crisis and was far from neutral.

As the example of the crisis in 1975 shows, the regional stability, especially on the NATO border, was an economic issue for the United States. According to its strategy, Morocco is one of the important key players in the region. Firstly, the Moroccan regime is known as pro-Western and can even permit to use their port and airbase for the American military forces.[44] Secondly, it also helped facilitate the initial Sadat-Begin contacts which later culminated in the Camp David Agreements (Solarz, 1979: 293). It means that Morocco can be a mediator for issues in the Middle East, particularly the Palestine problem. Furthermore, the Moroccan government decided to send their troops to Zaire to protect Western interests at the time of the second invasion by Katangan exiles living in Angola. Later, they supported the allies in the 1991 Gulf War and sent 2,000 troops to Saudi Arabia. Hence, President George H. W. Bush stated that Morocco has a "long history of leaning toward the West and the good alliance with the United States (Zoubir & Benabdallah-Gambier, 2006: 189)". Because of these Moroccan roles, The United States dramatically increased arms sales and military aid to Morocco, from $8.2 million in 1974 to $242 million in 1975. After that, additional weapons worth about $500 million were transferred directly to Morocco until 1979 (Ohaegbulam, 2002: 103). Morocco has received more than one-fifth of all US aid to the continent, totaling more than $1 billion in military assistance alone, since the beginning of the war over Western Sahara (Zoubir & Benabdallah-Gambier, 2006: 188).

On the other side, the United States is aware of the economic importance of Algeria. It provides nine percent of US crude oil imports and two percent of total natural gas consumption. In addition to this, US firms have won over $6 billion in construction contracts in the 1970s (Solarz, 1979: 289). Moreover, the United States regards Algeria as a leader in the Non-Aligned Movement, the Organization of African Unity, the Arab League, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Counties (OPEC); therefore its influence could disrupt Western interests toward the "Third World". Although Morocco was strategically important for the United States, they could not ignore Algeria's position. Thus, the US official policy toward the Western Sahara issue did not change from neutral status.

On the other hand, even though the United States suspected Soviet influence of the Polisario, its leaders indicated that they would be inclined, for economic and geopolitical

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Morocco owns 65 percent and Spain 35 percent (Solarz, 1979: 298).

[44] The Secretary of State, General Alexander Haig, announced the establishment of a US-Moroccan military commission and the opening talk for American use of Moroccan military bases during a visit to Marrakech in February 1982. As a result, the United States has held on to rights of emergency transit, staging, and refueling at the Moroccan bases (Kenitra, Benguerir, Nouaceur, Sidi Slimane and Ben Slimane). Furthermore, in November, the US Marines landed at Al-Hoceima, on Morocco's Mediterranean coast, for the first-ever Marine exercise on Moroccan territory (Wright, 1983: 164-168).

reasons, to look toward the West, instead of the East. They rather asked for support from the West European democratic socialist parties, not the East European communist parties. In fact, the Polisario is the only major liberation movement in Africa that has not received direct Soviet military assistance (Solarz, 1979: 287). At the same time, the Soviet Union had not recognized the Polisario government-in-exile. Interestingly, this Soviet attitude is related to its economic interests toward Morocco. At the moment in 1975, the Soviet Union and Morocco were close to concluding an agreement about phosphate trade –one of Moscow's largest barter deals ever reached with a "Third World" nation. According to their negotiation, Morocco allowed the Soviet Union to build a new phosphate mine in Meskala, from which the Soviet Union would receive 10 million tons of phosphates a year until 1990 (Zoubir, 1987: 18).[45] Needless to say, the Soviet Union could not ignore Algeria's geopolitical position. In late October 1975, Algeria allowed the Soviet Union to use its airbase during the crisis in Angola (both Algeria and the Soviet Union backed MPLA which was confronted with the South African backed-UNITA). Due to the Algerian cooperation, the Soviet Union made an effort to support the Sahrawi's right for self-determination at the United Nations Security Council in November 1975 (Zoubir, 1987: 20). In the same way as the United States, the Soviet Union also had to stay neutral for both economic and geopolitical interests; figure 7 can explain this cross relationship between the states.

Figure 7. The Relations between Morocco, Algeria and super powers in the Cold War

Above all, both the United States and the Soviet Union wished to prevent direct armed conflict between Morocco and Algeria due to their own interests; therefore, the military

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[45] The Soviet Union was not only interested in Moroccan phosphate, Morocco also imported oil (60 percent of the country's needs) from the Soviet Union at the time (Zoubir, 1987: 18).

powers of Morocco and Algeria have been controlled by the super powers through their exports. As table 2 demonstrates, the Algerian military's capacity was several times stronger than the Moroccan one. The super powers considered that the Western Sahara conflict would not become a regional conflict because of the overwhelming Algerian military capacity. Indeed, the Moroccan military forces have never crossed the border and attacked the refugee camp in Tindouf. Hence, the Western Sahara conflict was kept as *status-quo*.

Here we understand that the Western Sahara issue is a key point for the future of regional stability in the Maghreb. It can be obviously seen by the establishment of the Arab Maghreb Union –after thirty years of the Tangier plan–came just after Morocco and the Polisario reached a peace plan in 1988. In other words, the Western Sahara issue drives regional security and cooperation. For keeping this stability and their own economic interests, the super powers have avoided to intervene directly in the conflict. Thus, the Western Sahara problem is not only a regional issue, but also an international question.

Table 2. Comparison of military forces by its import amount (Unit: $1 million)

	Soviet	US	France	Others	Total
Algeria					
1975-78	1500	0	10	430	**1900**
1979-82	3200	0	30	500	**3800**
1983-87	2500	240	60	430	**3230**
Morocco					
1975-78	20	310	725	360	**1400**
1979-82	0	470	1100	325	**1900**
1983-87	0	260	310	270	**840**

Source: Daniel Volman (1993), "The Role of Foreign Military Assistance in the Western Sahara War", *International Dimensions of the Western Sahara Conflict*, London: Praeger Publishers (Table is made by the author).

2.4. The Current Situation of the Problem

We will now look at the current situation of the Western Sahara issue. The United Nations General Assembly first adopted Resolution 2072 on Western Sahara in 1965, which directs the Spanish government "to take immediately all necessary measures of the liberation of the Territories."[46] Since this resolution, the United Nations has supported the right of

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[46] The UN Webpage (03/03/2013):
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/218/35/IMG/NR021835.pdf?OpenElement

self-determination of Sahrawi. Firstly, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) focused on the issue. Soon, the divisions in the organization between those African countries favoring the Polisario and those taking the Moroccan side became clear and it even led to the delay or cancellation of the summit meetings in 1982 and 1983 due to the latter's boycott. As a result, Morocco resigned from the OAU, while SADR was recognized as a member of the organization (Zoubir & Pazzanita, 1995: 615).

After the failure of the OAU, the United Nations began to take a larger role for the resolution of the conflict. When Morocco and the Polisario officially reached a ceasefire with the United Nations Security Council Resolution 690, it also suggested establishing a United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) to set a transitional period of the territory and conduct a referendum to decide its future status –independence or integrated into Morocco.[47] However, the long-waited referendum has never taken place to this date. The main reason is that MINURSO faced a difficulty with identifying the eligible voters –Morocco demands 130,000 additional voters on the list for the referendum (Darbouche & Zoubir, 2008: 93). Moreover, not only has Morocco refused to renounce its military and administrative presence, but also they have disturbed MINURSO's mandate by surrounding its headquarters in Laayoune with their police or by interfering with its officers' contact with the local people (Zoubir & Pazzanita, 1995: 616). Although there have been proposals to abandon the United Nations endeavor in the Western Sahara by its Secretary-General, MINURSO's mandate has been recently renewed.[48]

In order to break the deadlock over MINURSO's mandate, Secretary-General Kofi Annan appointed former US Secretary of State James Baker as his special envoy in March 1997. Even though the Huston Agreements could show a certain result that Morocco and the Polisario agreed on voter identification,[49] Morocco did not stay on the agreement, and disagreement over the eligible voters –165,000 "Sahrawi" considered eligible voters by Morocco but not by the Polisario– prevented the referendum from taking place (Ohaegbulam, 2002: 95). Baker's next approach, a "Settlement Plan" in 2000, excluded the possibility of independence for Western Sahara and called for negotiations on limited self-rule of the disputed territory. Following this plan, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1945 in 2003, which endorsed the final version of Baker's plan.[50] This so called

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[47] The UNHCR Webpage (03/03/2013): http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3b00f16818.html

[48] The United Nations Security-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, for example, proposed to abandon the UN endeavor in the Western Sahara entirely in 1994; however the Security Council decided to continue the UN effort for the solution (Zoubir & Pazzanita, 1995: 624).

[49] Morocco and the Polisario had been unable to agree on the criteria for the eligibility of voters in the referendum. While Morocco had insisted on the inclusion of 170,000 additional voters, the Polisario insisted on limiting the list of voters to the 1974 Spanish census as the basis for eligibility, as the two sides had originally agreed to. As a result of the Huston Agreement, James Bakers estimated that the number of voters should revolve around 80,000 (Zoubir & Volman, 1997: 14-20).

[50] The UN Security Council Webpage (03/03/2013):
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N03/447/80/PDF/N0344780.pdf?OpenElement

"Baker Plan II" is based on a modified version of the "third way" (autonomy under Moroccan authority) with the notable addition of a referendum after a five-year transition period (Zoubir & Benabdellah-Gambier, 2006: 195). Surprisingly, the Polisario accepted this new plan, while Morocco rejected it due to the peace and security in the Maghreb region. The Sahrawi representative in Europe stated that "the Polisario made the decision as a logical and generous act to assure peace and reconciliation with the Moroccan neighbor and the peoples of the Maghreb (Zoubir & Benabdellah-Gambier, 2006: 195)". Although the Polisario made a compromise, the Moroccan side did not accept it. On the contrary, Morocco presented a project for the "Autonomous Region of Sahara",[51] which is the first project of autonomy that Morocco has officially presented and with the support of the King Mohamed VI in 2003. Despite the United Nation's and James Baker's efforts, the Western Sahara problem has not shown any progress for its resolution.

In addition, not only the United States and France particularly support Morocco in the Security Council, but also the European Union concluded a Fisheries Partnership Agreement with Morocco in 2006 –including the waters of Western Sahara (Chapaux, 2006: 217). Those facts gave deep disappointment and frustration to the Polisario's side, which could lead young people to return to armed conflict. As a matter of fact, the Gdeim Izik attack (one of the biggest clashes between Moroccan security forces and local population) in Western Sahara in 2011 clearly shows the local population's anger and frustration. At the same time, some scholars point out the link between some Sahrawi groups and Al-Qaida for Jihad in the Land of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) which has been recently increasing their power in the North Africa.[52] It seems like we may be faced with huge instability –which all of the powers were trying to avoid– in the region, because international organizations, including the United Nations, wanted to "forget" the issue and have not really tried to solve the question.

Above all, since the United Nations adopted Resolution 2072 to liberate the Western Sahara territory in 1965, the right of self-determination of the Sahrawi has never used. Although the international organizations, including the AU and UN, have tried to solve the issue, no actors have really put pressure on the Moroccan authorities to find the solution. Hence, the Polisario side has been disappointed by the status-quo situation and looked for the alternative solution, such as continuing the armed struggle. Because regional and international groups have not seriously faced the problem, the regional stability –which all actors are eager

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[51] The project does not respect "Baker Plan II". Particularly, it would only conclude a decolonization process in which Saharawi freely decides to be integrated into Morocco, not with self-determination. It opposes the demands of international law. Group de Estudios Estrantégicos (14/01/2013): http://www.gees.org/

[52] Anouar Boukhars and Ali O. Amar pointed out the al-Qaida-style executions in the city of Laayoune on November 8, 2010, when the riots clashed with security officers (Boukhars & Amar, 2011: 220). Peter Pham mentioned that the Polisario has become one of the principal pools of recruitment for AQIM (Pham, 2010: 20).

to maintain– has been threatened.

2.5. Chapter Summary

This chapter has allowed us to understand what the Western Sahara problem is about and its complicated features. It is a boundary question which was created by the former colonial powers. The boundaries were drawn without consideration for the local cultural ties. Therefore, when the time for decolonization came, the boundaries became a cause for the conflict amongst new "nation-states" in the post-colonial world. The Maghreb region is not an exception. Because the colonial power, Spain, could not play a sufficient role for the decolonization process of Western Sahara, neighboring states, Morocco and Algeria (and Mauritania) fell into a dispute over the post-colonial status of Western Sahara. At this point, the decolonization problem of Western Sahara shifted into a regional dispute.

Furthermore, the United States and the Soviet Union influenced the Moroccan and Algerian antagonism through geopolitical strategies and economic interests in the Maghreb region. Because the super-powers' strategic interests did not correspond with their economic ones, they preferred to keep the status quo and remain neutral toward the conflict. Thus, the Western Sahara conflict has not led to armed dispute between Morocco and Algeria. At the same time, the Sahrawi people have not seen the conflict solved. In addition, I must point out that the international organizations (the United Nation, African Union, etc.) could not play sufficient roles to solve the problem. Morocco is known as a pro-Western regime and is also located at the geo-politically important region –the south border of the NATO; therefore, it has been able to get support to maintain the "actual" condition from France and the United States particularly. Above all, the Western Sahara issue has not only implications for the Maghreb regional but also the international community.

Finally, it has been almost fifty years since Sahrawi's right of self-determination was adopted by the UN. Although the Sahrawi are fighting and waiting for the solution, as I mentioned above, the external condition of the issue does not allow for a resolution to be found. Who can ask them to have more patience? The recent movement –the Gdeim Izik camp event and the suspicion of being connected with the AQIM– perhaps shows that their patience has reached its limit. If the related states seek regional stability, first they should solve the problem inside the region. As long as Morocco and Algeria close the door for negotiation on the issue, it will be difficult to find a solution.

Chapter 3. Theory

Here I will discuss the definition and theory which I have used in this thesis. Firstly, I will define the words which have various meanings depending on the context, for instance, ethnicity, nation, or the word "nation-state". Should the word "nation" have equal meaning to the word "state"? I shall try to define these key words according to Anthony Smith's theory; "*National identity* (1991)".

After clarifying the difference between these words, the discussion will move to the impact of nationalism. Why could individuals fight for their nation in the name of nationalism at the cost of their own life? In obtaining the answer, I must consider the creation process of national identity and the character of the nationalism movement. In this process, I refer to the theories at Benedict Anderson, Ernest Gellner and Anthony Smith. Then, while focusing on the nationalism in former colonial states, I point out the difference between "state-building" and "nation-building" in the cases of Moroccan and Sahrawi nationalism. At the end of this chapter, I will discuss the possibility of transforming national identity. Since national identity has a multi-dimensional character, the national boundaries that have been drawn depend on the purpose of intellectuals. The question here is what kind of factors help to re-draw the national boundaries. Furthermore, though the national boundaries have a flexible aspect, its "sacred" character often causes conflict. The chapter will be concluded with the question whether the power of nationalism can create a boundary between the real families or not. Now I will start to discuss the definitions of the key words.

3.1. Definition

Firstly, it is important to define some key words which have various meanings depending on the context. Ethnicity (ethnie), nation and even state could be understood as having almost the same meaning. In this connection, both ethnicity and nation could be translated as "*minzoku* 民族" in Japanese, while "*kokka* 国家" would be the word for nation and state. In order to avoid confusion, many Japanese scholars have used *Katakana*[53] when they argue it in the academic discussion. Thus, it is necessary to define these three words, ethnicity, nation and state. In this process, I will refer to Anthony Smith's theory "*National Identity* (1991)".

3.1.1. Ethnicity and *Ethnie*

Smith defined the conception of ethnicity as a central idea between a "primordial"

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[53] *Katakana* is one of the Japanese writing forms. It is often used to write down foreign words without Japanese translation.

quality and a "situational" quality. A primordial quality of the concept of ethnicity is understood as one of the "givens" of human existence which has a continuous character. On the other hand, a situational quality is suggested by "instrumentalists" who argue that the "belonging to an ethnic group is a matter of attitudes, perceptions and sentiments that are necessarily fleeting and mutable, varying with the particular situation of the subject" (Smith, 1991: 20), which means that ethnic boundaries are fluid depending on their goals. However, Smith suggests that ethnicity has aspects of both continuity and fluidity. According to Smith, an ethnic group is;

> [a] type of cultural collectivity, one that emphasizes the role of myths of decent and historical memories, and that is recognized by one or more cultural differences like religion, customs, language or institutions. Such collectivities are doubly 'historical' in the sense that not only are historical memories essential to their continuance but each such ethnic group is the product of specific historical forces and is therefore subject to historical change and dissolution (Smith, 1991: 20).

Before going into detail of this definition, it is necessary to know how *ethnie* (ethnic communities) is constructed.[54] There are six main attributes of ethnic groups which Smith suggests (Smith, 1991: 21):

1. a collective proper name
2. a myth of common ancestry
3. shared historical memories
4. one or more differentiating elements of common culture
5. an association with a specific 'homeland'
6. a sense of solidarity for significant sectors of the population

With the exception of number 4, these elements are strongly subjective components. The mythical ties of ancestry and the land of our forefathers based on "shared historical memories" –whether those myths are true or not– are crucial elements in composing ethnic identity. On the contrary, objective attributes are also not ignored. When the objective "cultural makers" – language, religion, customs and pigmentation– gain political significance, such markers are endowed with diacritical significance, rather than durability and independent existence of themselves (Smith, 1991: 23). Hence, cultural attributes could be seen as objective within the context of ethnic boundaries. Above all, *ethnie* does not have only a primordial quality. It could be dissolved or be absorbed depending on the degree of the subjective significance of each of these attributes (Smith, 1991: 23).

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[54] Smith defined ethnie as "named human population with shared ancestry myths, histories and cultures, having an association with a specific territory and a sense of solidarity (Smith, 1997: 27)" Smith discussed the cultural community as the same way as the ethnic community here. He made distinguish between *ethnic categories* (human population whom at least outsiders consider to constitute a separate cultural and historical grouping) and *ethnic communities* (the populations have self-awareness as a separate collectivity) (Smith, 1991: 21).

However, Smith does not try to reinforce an argument of "instrumentalist" as against the primordial quality of *ethnie*. It is because the importance of antecedent cultural affinities in the redefining process of ethnic identities cannot be explained with the "instrumentalist" argument. In the other words, it should not be considered that cultural patterns are fixed nor that ethnic sentiments are "strategically" manipulated. It is rather needed to "reconstitute the notion of collective cultural identity itself in historical, subjective and symbolic terms" (Smith, 1991: 25). I explain it further below.

I describe the ethnic identification pattern in figure 8. Firstly, it shows that each individual has more than one identity. For example, the Sahrawi as an *ethnie* are composed by various clan (tribal) groups or family units. These family units are centered on individual identity. Then, collective cultural affiliations as the Sahrawi *ethnie*, as *Maghrebians (*North Africans*)*, as Muslims are seen in the form of a concentric circle.

Figure 8. Individual Collective Identities in the form of concentric circles

The next figure describes, what Smith calls above, "historical, subjective and symbolic terms" to construct a collective identity (Figure 9). A collective cultural identity is composed by 1) memories of earlier events in the history of that unit; historical term, 2) a sense of continuity from the past of successive generations of a given cultural unit of population; subjective term, and 3) destiny of that unit and its culture; symbolic term (Smith, 1991: 25). I categorized these three components as (1) past, (2) present and (3) future. With general understanding, the past cannot change, but the future can. The present is influenced by the events which happened at this moment. Smith said "traumatic developments", for example, warfare, have power to shift the lines of ethnic boundary regulation (Smith, 1991: 25-27). Figure 9 shows an example of the Sahrawi case. Before the anti-colonial war started, various clans as "sub-*ethnies*" had their own units. Although they repeated the battle for the resources between them, they kept ties with common language, tradition, culture and homeland (past). After the anti-colonial war against Spain and the liberation movement against Moroccan

occupation (present), the sub-*ethnies* have shared common destiny (future) and construct a new *ethnie*, called Sahrawi. The warfare stimulates emotion of the members of the sub-*ethnies* and the boundaries between them are redefined by crisis and fear which come from outside the boundaries. This is the case for coalescence, but it is also possible to have a result of division.

Figure 9. The Process of the Coalescence of Sahrawi as *Ethnie*

Thus, Smith said ethnicity "exhibits both constancy and flux side by side, depending on the purpose and distance of the observer from the collective phenomenon in question" (Smith, 1991: 25). In other words, because individuals have various collective identities in the form of a concentric circle, the boundaries could shift depending on which past is chosen to be the collective myths, how or from where (which position) the present events are concerned, or what kind of future and goal the individuals look for. Furthermore, as Smith said it cannot ignore a primordial quality of ethnicity, this shifting is limited within the certain collective identity circle. Therefore, ethnie is formalized by both "primordial" and "situational" qualities.

Now ethnicity's image becomes clear. Next, the discussion moves to the conception of nation. What is the difference between ethnicity and nation?

3.1.2. Nation

"Nation" or "national" have been used with various meanings; it could be the same meaning as "state", "country", or "ethnic". Thus, many scholars have tried to define the word. Here I use again Anthony Smith's conception of "nation" and try to define it for this thesis. At

this point, defining the word is especially important for understanding the difference between *ethnie* and nation.

Smith defined the word nation as;

> [a] named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, <u>a common economy and common legal rights and duties</u> for all members (Smith, 1991: 14, the underline was made by the author).

This is a very similar definition with that of ethnicity. Sharing historic territory, common myths, historical memories and culture matches with the attributes of *ethnie*. However, the latter parts, a common economy and legal rights and duties do not match with it. According to Smith, there is considerable overlap between *ethnies* and nations. He said "ethnic communities need not be resident in 'their' territorial homeland, nor a common division of labor or economic unity, common legal codes" (Smith, 1991: 40). *Ethnies* need a "historical" or mythological land as their symbolic homeland,[55] but it is not problematic whether they are actually living in the land or not. The question is whether a symbolic place is still kept in their mind to tie their unit or not. For example, Jewish people have kept their ethnic identity after nearly two thousand years of diaspora. They trace their founding character to Mount Sinai. Although it has a role to retain their religious potency, it has characterized as a myth in the sense of ethnic identity attributions. Therefore, the yearning for Zion was often more spiritual than actual (Smith, 1991: 33). In short, even though ethnic boundaries are composed by some degrees of political aspects which are related with warfare for instance, *ethnie* itself has neither actual political roles nor its own land. On the other hand, nations are expected to have actual political power with a common economy with common territory and common legal rights and duties for all members. This is the reason why nations are called "political communities" (Smith, 1991: 9).

According to the above discussion, for example, is it possible to say that Sahrawi is categorized as a nation? SADR in the refugee camp has political roles and laws in addition to ethnic attributions. Furthermore, even though most of the Sahrawi from the SADR side are not actually living in their homeland, Western Sahara, they have a right to manage the "free zone" in the territory. It means their homeland is not only a symbol or an imagination that also it actually exists. Hence, it can be said that the Sahrawi constitute a nation. But, we cannot ignore the Sahrawi population in the Moroccan occupied zone of Western Sahara. Are they categorized as members of the Sahrawi nation too? This question will be discussed later in this thesis.

Here it becomes clear what the difference between nations and *ethnies* is. *Ethnies* might have political will, but are not politicized like nations. This difference can be seen in

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[55] It is considered as a subjectively locating the nation hinges on a reading of ethnic history, which presupposes links between the generations of a community of history and destiny in particular places of the earth (Smith, 1991: 70)

the composition of the Moroccan nation. It is composed by various *ethnies*, like Tamazight, Arab and Jewish. They have not strongly claimed to create their own nation as independent state or even autonomous nation under the Moroccan sovereignty so far. Hence, those ethnic groups are not politicized. On the other hand, the Moroccan nation is based on a political movement; therefore, it is politicized (See 2.2. Nationalism). However, it cannot be denied that the nation is based on ethnic characters. With Smith's word, nation is reconstructed as "the ethnic core and integrating its culture with the requirements of a modern state and with the aspirations of minority communities" (Smith, 1991: 111). So now I must consider another political unit, the state. What distinguishes the state from the nation?

3.1.3. State

The word "nation-states" is often used in the social sciences. It is generally understood to mean that the "state" has its territorial sovereignty recognized by the international community. The word creates confusion as if nation and state were equal. However, only ten per cent of states would claim to be true "nation-states", in the sense that the state's boundaries coincide with the nation's boundaries (Smith, 1991: 15). In fact, one state holds various nations inside its boundary. So, now it is necessary to make sense of this tricky word.

The main difference between nations and states is found in their aims. The nation signifies a cultural and political bond and unites a single political community; however, it does not set as their first goal to build a state. Their goal is to obtain security and autonomy for their political community. On the other hand, states place a premium on "the solidarity and political commitments of their citizens, and on the sovereign jurisdiction of the nation-state within own boundaries" (Smith, 1991: 168). It means that citizens are formally members of states. Once states are recognized as sovereign states by the international community, they could have the right to reject external intervention in domestic affairs to protect its citizens. States seek for, in Smith's words, "triumphant unison as the sole acknowledged constituents of the equally misnamed 'inter-national' community" (Smith, 1991: 168).

It is better to use an example to understand the above arguments. Catalonia in Spain is well known due to its strong national movement.[56] Though there are some nationalists who want to obtain total independence as a state, most of the people in Catalonia are more interested in autonomy within a state and their cultural parity than independence. It means Spain as a state is composed of multi-nations like Catalonia, Andalucía, Galicia etc. On the

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[56] Catalonia experienced a strong cultural revival in the 1960s and 1970s. A major cause of this renewal was undoubtedly the vibrant expression of nationalist sentiment that has surged the region over the Franco Regime (Guérin & Pelletier, 2007: 5).

contrary, the Basque nation has a stronger national identity than Catalonia case.[57] As ETA is largely known as the Basque separatist group,[58] the Basque people have struggled for centuries against domination by the Spanish government to keep their national identity (Spencer & Croucher, 2008: 137). They look for "state-building" rather than "nation-building". At this point we can find a key to open the tricky word. If states could not provide equal cultural and political conditions to each nation, the nation seeks for total independence as a state to protect their security and boundary of the political community. In this sense, to obtain a status as a sovereign state is the most secure condition to manage a nation. Therefore, nation is considered as if it coincides with state. Nation and state, or "nation-state" is confusing in this sense.

Figure 10. The difference between ethnie, nation and state

Once again, figure 10 makes clear the difference between *ethnie*, nation and state. As the figure describes, *ethnie* is based on cultural background which has been influenced by political affairs from outside the units. Nation is a political community which has a cultural core in the center. State is a "triumphant unison" which has sovereign right. It often has

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[57] In the Basque, 52.5 per cent of the population exhibits a Basque identity whereas 35.9 per cent of the people residing in Catalonya consider themselves as Catalan first and foremost (Guérin & Pelletier, 2007: 6).

[58] ETA is known as "Basque Homeland and Freedom" and approximately 200 participants were surveyed. The younger and more radical members of the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV), which was found in 1898 and was the major political arm of the Basque separatist movement, split off to the ETA. They have struggled by armed resistance since the 19th century (Spencer and Croucher, 2008: 137-138).

several cultural cores and ideally these cores are kept in harmony in the union, but in many cases, nation does not coincide with the state boundary. Now the key words of this paper become clear. Based on these definitions, we move to discuss how to create national identity through nationalism in the next stage.

3.2. National Identity and Nationalism
3.2.1. National Identity: Multi-dimensional character

Before I start to discuss the creation process of national identity, it might be important to mention its multi-dimensional character. As I have already shown above, individuals have various collective identities. Similarly, national identity can also be combined with other types of identity –class, religious or ethnic– and with other ideologies like liberalism, fascism and communism (Smith, 1991: 14).

According to Smith, this multi-dimensional national identity is defined by both "external" and the "internal" functions. The external function has territorial, economic and political factors. Nations need a definite social space which can reveal the uniqueness of the nation's "moral geography". Then, based on the defined territory, nations underwrite the quest for control over their resources and manpower. Also, nations legitimate common legal rights and duties of legal institutions as a political factor (Smith, 1991: 16). On the other hand, national identity is constructed by the international functions as well. Nations not only socialize the members as "nationals" and "citizens" through compulsory, standardized, public mass education systems, but also strengthen common identity through the use of symbols – flags, anthems, uniforms, passport and currency (Smith, 1991: 16). As a result of these functions, "the nation becomes a 'faith-achievement' group, able to surmount obstacles and hardships" (Smith, 1991: 17). In short, these functions help individuals to find their location in the world and to define who are their "families" or "enemies".

Therefore, in the process of self-definition, "people have allegedly been willing to surrender their own liberties and curtail those of others" (Smith, 1991: 17). In other word, intellectuals do not only hesitate to suppress or banish the "enemies" which could not be integrated within the national boundary, but they can also sacrifice their liberties or even life to protect their "families". It can be said that the goal of "nation-building" –to build one political community– becomes a cause of conflicts.

National identity is combined with class, religion and ethnic categories. Then, while keeping an ethnic core of the most powerful *ethnie*, the national boundary is created by ideological, political, economic functions. Figure 11 shows one example of the boundary transformation between Morocco, Algeria and SADR. The first circle describes territorial boundaries which are based on sovereign states. I draw the circle of Western Sahara with a dotted line because almost half of the states in the world recognize its sovereignty. The next

one shows political boundaries under the Cold War situation. As we have already seen in chapter 2, Morocco is known as a pro-Western regime and Algeria kept political ties with the Soviet Union in the Cold War period. The economic function also draws a different boundary as the third circle shows. Maghreb states, Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Tunisia and Mauritania (SADR is excluded), founded the Arab Maghreb Union in 1989 for economic cooperation. Importantly, the boundaries have a flexible character; therefore, it could be re-drawn depending on which functions give determination to the intellectuals. The mission for the intellectuals here is to answer the question "who we are". When they face this question, they start to think of true collective "self". At this point, this consciousness brings them to a nationalist movement.

Figure 11. The boundary transformation among Morocco, Algeria and Western Sahara

3.2.2. Nationalism

Now the discussion encounters the important question for national identity construction; "who are we?" How can intellectuals find the answer to this question?

According to Benedict Anderson, vernaculars and print-capitalism have supported to create nations, what he calls "imagined communities" (Anderson, 1983: 39). When the sacred language (for example, Latin as the Bible language) has power to control religious communities, local linguistic differences within memberships were not paid attention. However, since a vernacular print-market has emerged within capitalism, the sacred language

has lost its status (Anderson, 1983: 40). During the process of vernacularizing, people start to think about themselves, who they are and who are not with them. Hence, Anderson says, what "made the new communities imaginable was /…/ interaction between a system of production and productive relations (capitalism), a technology of communications (print), and the fatality of human linguistic diversity" (Anderson, 1983: 42-43). Here the imagined communities are created as nations through categorizing "us" and "them".

Anderson also mentioned a nationalism definition by Ernest Geller: "[n]ationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it *invents* nations where they do not exist" (Anderson, 1983: 6). In short, nations are imagined through nationalism. Gellner explained nationalism as a process with two different cultural styles. One is "wild culture" that can reproduce itself from generation to generation without conscious design or supervision. The other one is "garden cultures" which developed from the wild cultures and sustained by literacy and special personnel (Gellner, 1983: 50). According to Gellner, there is no sense to ask people who live in wild cultures whether they love their own culture or not, because they look at it like the air, they are not even conscious of it (Gellner, 1983: 61). Through the experiences in an exo-society –particularly through the education which is protected by the state authority, people face the difference between school-transmitted culture (garden cultures) and their own. Then they begin to be aware of love or sentiment to one's own culture (Gellner, 1983: 61). At this point, the boundary would become clear and they might not hesitate to sacrifice their life to protect the patriotic culture. This is a cause to stand for nationalism.

Lastly, I want to come back to Smith's argument of nationalism. He explained nationalism as "the doctrine that makes the nation the object of every political endeavor and national identity the measure of every human value /…/ of a world community and it moral unity (Smith, 1991: 18)."[59] In short, nationalism is the identity solution proposed by the nationalists who fight to create or protect their own nation (Smith, 1991: 97). As a result of scientific development, it becomes difficult to find identity solution in traditional religion. This identity crisis gave intellectuals a priority task to find an alternative solution. Thus, they re-discover their identities through replacing religious culture and familial education with historicist culture and civic education. This is how intellectuals or nationalists create nationalism movements (Smith, 1991: 92). Nationalism is "the sole vision and rationale of political solidarity today and one that commends popular assent and elicits popular enthusiasm" (Smith, 1991: 176).

Above all, Anderson, Gellner and Smith have similar ideas about nationalism. They defined nations only in terms of the age of nationalism, not the other way around. Also mass

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[59] Smith defined nationalism "as an ideological movement for attaining and maintain autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a population deemed by some of its members to constitute an actual or potential 'nation' (Smith, 1991: 73)".

public education, particularly mother-tongue, is pointed out as having an important role in creating national identity. Furthermore, all of them agree it is a political action. Nevertheless, their arguments show slightly different conceptions. Anderson and Gellner argued that nations are imagined as "a contingency" (Gellner, 1983: 6); therefore it is considered a modern phenomenon. On the contrary, Smith's argument is based on the ethnic core. Though he also considers nation as "invented" in the modern area, it is deeply dependent on earlier tradition and culture. In any case, nationalism is a kind of "civic religion" to create national identity and nations.

3.2.3. From Colony to Nation: Anti-colonial "Nationalism"

After the above discussion, it becomes clear what nation and nationalism are. Now I will focus on the anti-colonial nationalism which is related to the Western Sahara problem. As it is largely known, most of the borders in Africa were defined by the European colonial powers without regard of ethnic borders. Needless to say, these artificial borders have been a cause of many conflicts nowadays. What have made it so complicated to build a "nation-state" in former colonial states? And what is the key factor in succeeding to create a nation?

In order to understand the character of former colonial states, it helps to compare it to the one of former imperial states. Japan is one of the most successful cases in nationalism.[60] Because of its geopolitical and ethnically homogenous character, Japan was unified in the early medieval era. Although the small Ainu and Ryukyu minorities can be pointed out, it is possible to recognize Japan as an "ethnie-nation-state", which means the state boundary almost coincides with the ethnic one. Based on the Japanese ethnic community, its national identity was created through imperial auspices and *samurai* culture (Smith, 1991: 105). On the contrary, former colonial states are doubly circumscribed; one is the "sanctity" of colonial units and boundaries, and the other is the presence of a dominant *ethnie* (Smith, 1991: 114). It means that while they must create a nation within the colonial boundary where various different *ethnies* co-exist, a dominant *ethnie* should characterize the new nation within the hybrid cultural ground. At this point, a dominant ethnie must "re-discover" or create an ethno-history which other ethnies can accept. In brief, ethno-history is a key factor to build a nation.

Moroccan Nationalism

Here are two examples of Moroccan and Sahrawi nationalism. Before I go into detail of these nationalisms, I should not forget to mention the anti-colonial movement, in the

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[60] It does not mean as a cause for the first and the second of World War. It means the degree of the unification through nationalism.

Maghreb region; which could be said to be "Maghreb nationalism". Most of the region, expect some parts of Morocco and Western Sahara which were controlled by Spain, had been ruled by French forces. While other Asian and African colonies had awakened to liberation movements, the Maghreb intellectuals were also inspired by the ideologies like "pan-Islamism" or "pan-Arabism" and set a goal to build a Maghreb Federation after its independence. However, this attempt was not carried out at the time, the intellectuals focused on building their own "state" within the colonial borders. Taking into account this case, the anti-colonial struggle is not really a nationalism movement with the purpose of creating a nation. Colonial intellectuals fought to achieve a common goal of independence from the colonial power, but there is no potential "nation" aspect (Smith, 1991:108).

Bringing back the discussion to the Moroccan case, its own governmental system "*makhzan*" has existed since before the French Protectorate time. Under the makhzan system, there are two conceptual categories; *bilād al-makhzan*, the land of the government which is directly controlled by the sultan, and *bilād al-sība*, the land outside governmental control which has degrees of autonomy from the central government (Wyrtzan, 2011: 229). The borders between *bilād al-makhzan* and *bilād al-sība* are constantly defined by negotiation among the *makhzan* and various urban and seminomadic rural groups.[61] The Sultan is recognized as a symbolic power through *bay'a* (allegiance),[62] and in return, he protects the people, who gave him *bay'a,* with *dahir* (a royal decree) (Hodges, 1983a: 26). After France launched a "total pacification" of Moroccan territory, the balance between makhzan and *bilād al-sība* began to be lost. As a result of the centralization, the autonomous structure in *bilād al-sība* was broken down, and simultaneously the difference between urban Arab and rural Berber groups was highlighted (Wyrtzan, 2011: 230). However, when the time for anti-French and Spanish liberation movement came, intellectuals united Morocco under the name of "the Greater Morocco (*al-Maghreb al-Kabīr*)". It was claimed by 'Allāl al-Fāsī, a leader of the Istiqlāl Party, known as a deeply religious man (Weiner, 1979: 22), to be the area of "the Greater Morocco" based on the religious authority of Moroccan sultans from centuries ago (see the figure 6). According to the idea of the Greater Morocco, Moroccan intellectuals obtained independence in 1956. Here Morocco as a "state" was founded.

As most of the former colonial states have experienced, the Moroccan state had difficulty in managing its territory which was inherited from colonial boundaries. Their first mission was to create a national identity within various different ethnic groups; Arab, Berber, Jews, Sahrawi, Christian etc. Therefore, re-discovering or making their ethno-history became an urgent need. While the domestic socio-political tension was increasing in the beginning of

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[61] The regions of difficult access such as the mountains of the Rif and the three Atlas ranges, Sahara area were categorized as *bilād al-sība* (Hodges, 1983a: 25).
[62] Moroccan sultans have been known as the most powerful rulers in the Maghreb and respected their claim to the guardianship of Western Islam as amir al-muminin (commnder of the faithful) (Hodges, 1983a: 26).

the 1970s, King Hassan II announced "the Green March" to recover Western Sahara in 1975 (see footnote 29). This event had a role to "re-discover" or create an ethno-history for the Moroccan "nation". The King declared his charismatic holiness with the name of "*sharīf* (descendent of the Prophet Muhammad)". The Qur'an was the only weapon for the marchers, and the King bolstered their belief that they were going forth as *mujahhidīn* (holy warriors) to "re-cover" the part of their religious dynasty which was invaded by the Christian force (Weiner, 1979:27). Upon his wish, the number of volunteers for the march far exceeded the King's quotas.[63] For example, in Agadir 66,589 men, women and young people volunteered to meet a quota of 33,000 (Weiner, 1979: 31). They followed the King's march to "re-cover" Western Sahara by the name of *jihad* (holy war). At that moment, Arab and Berber were united for one "national" goal. This shows that the impact of the march spreads into not only intellectuals but also the whole population.

Hence, the anti-colonial "nationalism" in 1956 is considered "state-building". On the other hand, the nationalism based on "the Green March" has a "nation-building" character. The King succeeded in making an ethno-history to unify the nation by a symbolic "myth" of "the Green March". Nevertheless, we cannot forget that the Sahrawi's will was excluded from the Moroccan nationalism in 1975.

Sahrawi Nationalism

Sahrawi nationalism is a very recent phenomenon. Their life is based on tribal identity and loyalty, so they had never experienced ethnic unity until the late 1950s. Because of the harsh natural conditions of the desert, small nomadic groups had to migrate over a vast area in search of pastures for the animals. Needless to say, it was not easy to establish a large state structure. On the contrary, there was often inter-tribal conflict about their livestock (Hodges, 1983b: 28). However, development of the natural resources, particularly the phosphate industry, changed the traditional life-style of the Sahrawi in the 1950s. They had begun to settle in the coastal cities, mainly Dakhla and Laayoune, for the jobs which the Spanish companies provided.[64] By 1974 almost 8,000 Sahrawi worked as wage-earners in the territory and 55 per cent of the total number of Sahrawis recorded in the 1974 census were settled in the cities (Hodges, 1983a: 130-131). Through the sedentarization and encounter of

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[63] The King set the number of volunteer for each province. In Oujda 11,832 volunteered to meet a quota of 1,500; Rabat-Sale 20,018 for a quota of 10,000 (Weiner, 1979: 31).

[64] IPASA, a new Western Sahara fishing enterprise which was invested by Spanish public and private capital, built processing facilities in Dakhala in 1948. After that the annual total fish catch was notably increased. Although 657 tons of fish were landed in the territory in 1949, it reached 11,800 tons in 1974. Also the Empresa Nacional Minera del Sahara (ENMINSA) announced a proven deposit of 1.7 billion tons of ore at Bou-Craa (about 67 miles southeast of Laayoune) during the 1950s and began the Bou-Craa phosphate project (Hodegs, 1983a: 123-127).

other "ethnie (Spanish)", Sahrawi noticed their commonality and began to build ethnic ties based on their common cultural background.

At the time of "Maghreb nationalism", many Sahrawi were enrolled in the Moroccan Army of Liberation, because this movement had a trans-frontier, anti-colonial character (Hodges, 1983b: 31). Nevertheless, the Sahrawi's will was abandoned after Moroccan independence. The Army of Liberation was replaced by the Force Armées Royales (FAR), which consisted of former Moroccan troops of the French and Spanish armies, and then the fighters from the Army of Liberation were considered as a potential danger to the monarchy (Hodegs, 1983a: 75). Therefore, Sahrawi in Western Sahara had to remain under Spanish control and seek their own liberation movement.

The new Sahrawi anti-colonial movement came in the late 1960s from a young Sahrawi, Mohammed Sidi Ibrahim Bassiri, who received a modern education in Casablanca, Cairo and Damascus. While he was teaching the Qur'an and Arabic in the mosque at Smara, he recruited the nucleus of an underground anti-colonial movement, which came to be known as the *Harakat Tahrir Saguia el-Hamra wa Qued ed-Dahab* (Organization for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Oued ed-Dahab) (Hodges, 1983b: 48). The organization was recognized as the first urban-based Sahrawi political movement and they set a goal of independence for Western Sahara. On 17 June 1970, however, Bassiri was arrested in the counter-demonstration to the Spanish government and never reappeared after. At the same time, hundreds of supporters for Bassiri were arrested and some people were killed by Spanish force at the demonstration (Hodges, 1983b: 48-49).[65] The liberation movement was disbanded here.

It did not take a long time to build up a new liberation movement. The birth of the second movement also illustrated the role of young university-educated Sahrawi, El-Ouali Mustapha Said. Like many other Sahrawis, he was settled in Tan-Tan (part of Spanish Southern Morocco) after the defeat of the Army of Liberation and graduated from Mohammed V University in Rabat (Hodges, 1983b: 50). He was a member of the Sahrawi student collective in Rabat in 1970-2 and the group worked to support the Moroccan opposition parties which had railed against the King's regime for its collaborative relations with Spain (Hodges, 1983b: 51).[66] They focused on opposing the Spanish colonization. Indeed, they did not deny the idea of Western Sahara's integration with Morocco at that point.[67] As a result of the suppression by Moroccan authorities, however, the Sahrawi liberation movement had to move into their home, Western Sahara.

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[65] According to Spanish government, 2 Sahrawis were killed. Also Moroccan source reported 10-12 people are killed in the event (Hodges, 1983b: 49).
[66] El-Ouali and his associates met the leaders of the Istiqlal Party, including Allal el-Fassi, and of the UNFP and a secretary-general of PLS, Ali Yata (Hodges, 1983a: 159).
[67] El-Ouali had written a memorandum for the UNFP exiles in Algers, which did not explicitly mention independence as a sole goal (Hoedges, 1983b: 52).

On 10 May 1973, "The Polisario Front" (the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el Hamra y Río de Oro) was born in Western Sahara with the hands of El-Ouali and his associates. The Polisario Front issued a manifesto which said the front is the "unique expression of the masses, opting for revolutionary violence and the armed struggle as the means by which the Sahrawi Arab African people can recover its total liberty and foil the maneuvers of Spanish colonialism" (Hodges, 1983a: 161). At this point, Sahrawi intellectuals united the people who lived in Western Sahara to achieve the goal; independence. Just like Moroccan "nationalism" in 1956, the movement was limited almost exclusively to the intellectuals; therefore, it is also characterized as "intellectual nationalism" to build a "state".

After the Sahrawi diaspora in 1975, the Polisario proclaimed the birth of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) in Tindouf, southwest of Algeria, in February 1976. SADR is recognized as a sovereign state by more than 70 states in the world. Recently, Kenya, one of the African Anglophone states, recognized the SADR in 2005. Also SADR is a member of the African Union since 1983 (Due to this decision of the organization, Morocco withdrew from it in 1984). While SADR authorities focus on the "state-building", they do not ignore the challenge of "nation-building".

There were two waves of nation-building in the refugee camp. The first is the time of war before the cease-fire in 1991 and the other is the cease-fire period. In the first period, these four factors inspired their struggles; 1) a common desire; independent as a state, 2) a common enemy; Morocco is replaced after Spain, 3) a common destiny; to survive as refugees under harsh conditions, and 4) a common myth "*ghazian* (raids)"; and a symbol of the Sahrawi secular resistance against any sort of domination (Martin, 2007: 569), produced a national identity as "we are all Sahrawi" in the camp where various clans co-exist. The visual symbols −waving of national flags when the fighters returned to the camp and parading Moroccan prisoners and weapons captured in the battlefield− also strengthened national identity based on the anti-Moroccan strategy.

On the other hand, the visual symbols and the fear of bombardment were ended by the cease-fire. The arena to create national identity was replaced by the community from the battlefield. The authority focused on two main fields; one is politics and the other is education. The refugees in Tindouf are citizens of SADR; therefore, the citizens are members of the political cells and administrative committees which can suggest matters to the parliament level.[68] The system is designed so all adults take part in the politics. Moreover, Sahrawi women's participation is highly valued. They assumed the duty of building institutions, such as schools and hospitals. 25 per cent of the seats in the Sahrawi Parliament were held by women in 2011 (Lakhal, 2012: 50).

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[68] The camp is divided as provinces (wilayaat), each with its own governor (wali). It is also subdivided into six or seven districts (dawa'er) and neighborhoods or municipalities (ahyia') (Farah, 33).

Also the authorities put effort into the national education. The growth of the literacy rate –it reached 90 per cent in 2005, compared 5 per cent in 1975– is one of the visible successes for national education (Oleynik, 2005: 27). This makes it possible to share the knowledge of the conflict and the reason why they are fighting. Randa Farah discussed the textbooks which were introduced by the Sahrawi Ministry of Education. She said that "the school textbooks encourage loyalty to the nation; praise the revolution, its martyrs, and heroes; and suppress the memory of tribes and especially old tribal feuds" (Farah, 36). Once again, it shows that ethno-history helps to create the national identity, "we are all Sahrawi", by making it clear what they struggle for. In this process, they try to forget old tribal boundaries.

Above all, Sahrawi nationalism went the same way as the Moroccan one. It began as an intellectual nationalism to establish a "state", then, nation-building came after. The important thing here is that Sahrawi nationalism was mainly created in the refugee camp. This means that the Sahrawi under Moroccan rule have not received the same nationalism impact, at least in the spatial aspect.

3.3. *"Oath of the Horatii"*: Transformation of National Identities
3.3.1. Coalition or Secession: Assyria and Ruritanians

Before I go on to discuss transformation of national identities, I must point out two examples of the transformation of ethnic identity. The first is Assyria. Anthony Smith explains this example of ethnic extinction;

> The goal of Assyria's enemies was destruction of her hated rule /…/ but this did not mean exterminating every Assyrian. Perhaps the Assyrian élites were evicted; but, in any case, in terms of religion and culture they were less and less differentiated from the Babylonian civilization they sought to emulate. Besides, the latter days of the vast Assyrian empire witnessed /…/ use of an Aramaic lingua franca for commercial and administrative purposes following a large influx of Arameans. Hence the ethnic distinctiveness of the Assyrians was severely compromised well before the downfall of the empire (Smith, 1991: 32).

Cultural syncretism[69] helps the coalition of Assyrian to the surrounding ethnies. As Gellner argued, "an at least provisionally acceptable criterion of culture might be languages /…/ a difference of language to entail a difference of culture" (Gellner, 1983: 44). Most of all, use of an Aramaic lingua franca became one of the important tools in creating a common culture. After a long time had passed since cultural syncretism started, Assyrian ethnic identity naturally transformed into the surrounding ethnies. Thus, Assyrian ethnie was assimilated

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[69] Syncretism is known as a religious term. Andre Droogers said "the basic objective meaning refers neutrally and descriptively to the mixing of religions. The subjective meaning includes an evaluation of such intermingling from the point of view of one of the religions involved" (Droogers, 1989: 7). Here I used it to describe a cultural intermingling situation.

with others without large difficulty.

On the contrary, there is a case of secession. Gellner explained it with the example of Ruritanians;[70]

> The Ruritanians were a peasant population speaking a group of related and more or less mutually intelligible dialects, and inhabiting a series of discontinuous but not very much separated pockets within the lands of the Empire of Megalomania. The Ruritanian language /…/ was not really spoken by anyone other than these peasants. /…/ In the nineteenth century a population explosion occurred at the same time as certain other area of the Empire of Megalomania –but not Ruritania– rapidly industrialized. The Ruritanian peasants were drawn to seek work in the industrially more developed area, and some secured it, on the dreadful terms prevailing at the time. As backward rustics speaking an obscure and seldom written or taught language, they had a particularly rough deal in the towns to whose slums they had moved /…/ it was perfectly possible for the Ruritanians, if they wished to do so (and many did), to assimilate into the dominant language of Megalomania. /…/ they (The Ruritanians nationalists) deplored the discrimination to which their co-nationals were subject, and the alienation from their native culture to which they were doomed in the proletarian suburbs of the industrial towns (Gellner, 1983: 59-60).

At the end of the Ruritanians' story, they achieved independence. Although many of the Ruritanians assimilated into Megalomanian language, they still kept Ruritanian ethnic identity. This is because they almost shared the same destiny (discrimination) in the cities and Ruritania still existed as their homeland. Furthermore, the Ruritanian nationalists, who had public mass education in the cities, stood up for creating Ruritanian national identity. As a result of these factors, Ruritania succeeded to transform ethnic identity to national identity.

There is a reason to bring up long quotes here. I want to explain the Sahrawi's national identity transformation with these examples later. The Sahrawi, who live in Western Sahara under Moroccan rule, are educated by Moroccan education. Also *Darija* (Moroccan Arabic) is largely used in the public space and the media sources, even though most of them speak Hassaniya in their daily life. As long as they are citizens of the territory, Moroccan authority provides them equal civil rights as "Moroccans". Moreover, at least they are living in their homeland, which is very different from the refugee situation in Tindouf. Also as I discussed above, the Sahrawi nationalism movement originated in the camp. Considering the above situation, which destination will the Sahrawi choose? The Assyrian or Ruritanian case? The answer will be found later in this thesis.

3.3.2. *"Oath of the Horatii"*: Corruption of real families

At last, I will introduce one picture by Jacques-Louis David. Smith points out one of his famous political paintings, *"Oath of the Horatii (1784)"* which is considered one of the most significant works in French Revolutionary culture. The Story was taken from Titus-Livy.

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[70] Ruritania is an imaginary country which is introduced in *"The prisoner of Zenda"* by Anthony Hope (Gellner, 2000: 99, Japanese version).

In Rome's early days, one tiny state under King Tullus's rule and its rival state of Alba had a dispute. Each state had a trio of brothers –the Horatii and the Curiatii– which had almost equal power as warriors. Then their monarchy decided that these brothers should fight each other, instead the entire populations, and the defeated state would peacefully submit to the victorious one (Gutwirth, 2011: 1). As a result of the battle, the Horatii won even though they lost two brothers. The picture (image 1) depicts the three Horatii brothers who swore on their father's sword to conquer or die for their homeland or fatherland (Smith, 1991: 76).

Image 1.　 *˝Oath of the Horatii˝* by David (1784)

Source: Web Gallery of Art[71]

However, why are the women on the right side of the picture crying? It is because one of the sisters of the Curiatii, Sabina, was married to one of the Horatii, while one of the sisters of the Horatii, Camilla, was betrothed to one of the Curiatii.[72] Despite the ties between the two families, the brothers did not hesitate to kill other "family" for their *patria*. The story did not end here. When Camilla's brother saw her crying for her betrothed's death, he killed her, and said "Go to your betrothed with your ill-timed love, forgetful as you are of your dead brothers, of the one who still lives and of your country! So perish every Roman woman who mourns for an enemy." (Gutwirth, 2011: 2) This event shows real family ties could be destroyed before the unity of *patria*. With Smith's word, "real families can constitute an obstacle to the ideal of a homogeneous nation wherever nationalism embraces the ideal in that extreme form" (Smith, 1991: 78).

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[71] Web Gallery of Art (26th of May 2013):
http://www.wga.hu/frames-e.html?/html/d/david_j/2/201david.html
[72] Boston College: (26th of June, 2013)
http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/cas/his/CoreArt/art/neocl_dav_oath.html

If we return to the Western Sahara case, there are many families who live separated between Laayoune and the Tindouf refugee camp. For example, the president of SADR, Mohamed Abdelaziz, has a father, Khalil Rkibi, who is one of the members of CORCAS (the Royal Advisory Council for Saharan Affairs which Mohammed VI revived in 2006) and is also a retired non-commissioned officer of the Royal Moroccan Army living in Kasbah Tadla (Pham, 2010: 10).[73] I would like to discuss how the real families' ties influence Sahrawi nationalism latter in this paper.

3.4. Chapter Summary

At the beginning of this chapter, I define the key words for this thesis; *ethnie,* nation and state by referring to the theory, "*National Identity* (1991)" by Anthony Smith. *Ethnie* is based on cultural background and its boundary is drawn by the political pressure from outside of the unit. On the contrary, nation is a political community which is created by political reason, mainly for autonomous status due to security reasons. Most of the time, the nation has an ethnic core in the center. If the nation has sovereign right, it is recognized as a state. Generally, when a nation seeks sovereignty as an independent state, it is confused with the word, "nation-state"; however, there are few states that meet with the boundary of nations.

Based on the above definitions, the discussion moved to the characteristics of national identity. It is understood as the collective identity which has an ethnic core in the center and is categorized by various cultural factors –religion and language– and ideologies. As we see in figure 8, one Sahrawi might identify himself as Maghrebian, or with a much broader aspect, Muslim. It depends on which condition he based it on. Figure 11 shows that the collective boundary shifts into a different shape depending on the economic reason or political strategy. Likewise, national identity as a political identity can be transformed into a broader or narrower line. It depends on the determination of intellectuals, who can answer the question "who are we?". In short, intellectuals define the national boundary according to "why we struggle" and "who our enemy is". Thus, based on its determination, anti-colonial "nationalism" aims at building a state. However, they are faced with the inner cultural difference within the state when they obtained independence. At the point, "nation-building" is initiated by seeking or even creating ethno-history. We have already seen this in the case of the Moroccan and Sahrawi nationalism. Although national boundary has a flexible aspect, the strength of nationalism can harm even real family ties. As we see in the picture of *"Oath of the Horatii"*, not only does a nationalist not hesitate to sacrifice his life, but also extreme loyalty to the nation (*patria*) can cause him to kill his own family in the name of nationalism.

Based on these theories which I have explained here, I suggest these three points in

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[73] Kasbah Tadla is a walled city built in the seventeenth century by Moulay Ismail, second sultan of the Alaouite Dynasty (Pham, 2010: 10).

the case of the Western Sahara problem; 1) Are the Sahrawi composed as an ethnie or nation?; 2) What kind of future state will the Sahrawi, who live in Western Sahara with Moroccan rule, choose, coalition with Morocco or total independence?; and 3) Despite the result of question number 2, is it possible for the Sahrawi to keep real family ties? These questions will be discussed later in chapter 6.

Chapter 4. Methodology: Individual Interviews and Focus Group Interviews

In this chapter, I will discuss the methods that I have used in my fieldwork-based research. The aim of this study is to understand 1) what kind of political opinions do local ethnic groups have for the future status of Western Sahara?; 2) Which kind of national identities do they have? Are there any differences depending on the ethnics, individual experiences or their social status? To obtain the answers to these questions, I prefer to use a qualitative approach rather than a quantitative one, because, as long as my research topic includes sensitive and subjective aspects, I must observe the respondents' reaction to the answers and the ways they express their opinions, not only collecting the answer itself. Therefore, I use interviewing as a qualitative method of my research.

I will start by describing the general understanding of interviewing, including its definition and uses. Then, I will focus on featuring interview discourse through conceptions of recontextualization and *re-presentation*. Taking into consideration these aspects of the method, I explain concretely how I conduct my fieldwork, for example, the settings of the interviews, how I recruit the respondents and the role of the moderator.

4.1. Interviews
4.1.1. What are Interviews?

The aim of this section is to explore the effectiveness and different uses of interviewing as a data collecting strategy. To understand something about people's activities and attitudes, the best way of finding out it is to ask them. This direct contact provides interaction between participants, and these encounters create *vox populi* (Brenner, Brown & Canter, 1985: 2). According to Holstein and Gubrieum, in any type of interview, "there is always an image of the research subject lurking persons placed in the role of interview respondent" and particularly in a traditional approach, "subjects are basically conceived as passive *vessels of answer* for experiential questions put to respondents by interviewers" (Hosterin & Gubrieum, 1999: 108). It means that the putative agent stands behind the participants. The agent can be the society, the agency, the tribe, the clan, the family, the community or the monarch that is held practically and morally responsible for the participants' words and actions (Gubrieum & Holstein, 1999: 24). The subjects, who are considered as individuals, are not only "individuals" but at the same time engaged in epistemological agency –which can be understood as an invisible "repository". This is the reason why the result is passive communication. On the contrary, in active interviewing, the interview and its participants are considered to be constantly developing. Since the interview setting is decided by the participants –when the interviews are conducted, how to select respondents, what the topic is, and how to interpret the responses-, interviewing itself is a consisted active project

for producing meaning (Holstein & Gubrieum, 1999: 113). Thus, the interaction among interviewers and respondents contribute to producing knowledge.

Above all, although the participants could not be totally independent from their agency, I consider, depending on the interview setting, that interviews also can have active function to produce data. Therefore, interviewing technique is largely used to generate empirical data about the socio-political world, particularly in the cases when qualities are needed to be identified.

4.1.2. Interview Methods

I used two types of interviews; individual interviews and focus group interviews. Although I was planning to conduct only focus group interviews, for security reason, it was difficult to create the situation for focus group interviews in the ongoing conflict region. Thus, I combine the two interviewing methods.

David L. Morgan, Jenny Kitzinger and Rosaline S. Barbour agree that the main purpose for focus groups is the use of interaction in order to generate data (Morgan, 1998a: 57, Kitzinger & Barbour, 1999: 4). Focus groups are group discussions which explore a specific set of issues by debating a set of questions. It encourages the participants to talk to each other by asking questions, exchanging anecdotes, and commenting on each others' experiences and points of view (Kitzinger & Barbour, 1999:4). Claire Waterton and Brian Wynne state the definition of focus groups as "a methodology for ascertaining community attitudes (Waterton & Wynne, 1999: 127)" They believe that people express themselves in a relational manner. According to them, focus groups can be used to explore "relational" aspects of the way that a local people feel about risks. In this way, the connections between how people experience, define, think, feel and represent risks in relation to wider debates about the community in which the participants live can be identified (Waterton & Wynne, 1999: 129). Hence, according to Susan E. Short, some researchers call it "focus group discussion" instead of "focus group interviews", because the interaction among participants in groups is highlighted more than when interviewing individuals or groups (Short, 2006: 106).

4.1.3. Uses

Firstly, it is better to make clear the difference between interviews and the survey questionnaire (which has been largely used in the field) to understand functions of the former method. According to Morgan, although both of them are techniques for gathering information from people, there are considerable differences. In surveys, a fixed set of questions are used with exactly the same set of predetermined response options. On the contrary, interviews have more flexibility in the questions themselves and also in the answers.

Moreover, when it comes to analysis, a survey focuses on numerical summaries, while interviews involve a more subjective process of making sense of what was said in the groups (Morgan, 1998a: 30). The most notable difference here is that interviews rely on the strengths of qualitative methods, but a survey searches for the quantitative aspects (Morgan, 1998a: 31). Thus, interviews are more useful for qualitative data which are not often seen as statistical representativeness.

Kitzinger and Barbour discuss that there are several reasons why interviews are appropriate to use in the field; 1) focus group work explores how accounts are articulated, censured, opposed and changed through social interaction; 2) it is better for exploring how points of view are constructed and expressed; 3) it is also invaluable for examining how knowledge, ideas, story-telling, self-presentation and linguistic exchanges operate within a given cultural context (Kitzeinger & Barbour, 1999: 5). According to these reasons, interview techniques have been often used for marketing research and incorporated into social sciences. Particularly, focus groups can be one of the most instrumental ways to examine the norms and processes that operate in public discourse through group discussions as a microcosm of the reality of everyday conversations (Morgan & Fellows, 345).

4.2. Interview Discourse

Next, we move our interests to the textualizing process. Charles L. Briggs discussed an aspect of how to create discourse by recontextualizing the data in interviewing. Firstly, he points out functions of 'bias' and "distortion" which underlie interview-based research. Interviews are saturated with these effects. Researchers "imagine the social worlds depicted in the content of responses, creating images of political participation, family life, work experience" (Briggs, 2003: 246). On the other hand, respondents also "shape their responses in keeping with imaginings of future texts and audiences" (Briggs, 2003: 246). Therefore, he stated that "constructing the interview itself as the locus of knowledge production places audiences and analysts alike in the grip of a powerful illusion" (Briggs, 2003: 251). This 'illusion' could be some broader scholarly corporations or political agendas which control the process of decontextualization and recontextualization of discourse. The texts which are created through the use of interview data are often imagined, manipulated or politicized. Furthermore, interviews play "key roles in the political technologies of the modern era, being central to the power of the state to enumerate and imagine its citizens" (Briggs, 2003: 252).

In this point, we can see the process to create interview discourse from one social setting to others. Holstein and Gubrieum describe it as 'the meaning-making process' which means that the analytic objective is not merely to describe the situated production of talk or summaries of what interview participants have said, but to show the reader how it is being said (Holstein & Gubrieum, 1999: 118). During this recontextualizing process of the data,

researchers create interview discourse.

This argument is similar to Edward Said's *Orientalism* theory, especially his *re-presentation* conception.[74] Orientalism can be simply explained as what the Orientalist – who write or research the Orient– do (Said, 1978: 2). While Said focused on the academic Orientalism after the late eighteen century, he tried to explain how Orientalism has politically, ideologically and culturally produced and even been producing discourses. For example, after September 11, the negative image of Islam and Arabs has spread in the West. Muslims are considered as terrorist, extremists and violence lovers etc. These stereotype images are strongly created by television, films, and media resources during the propaganda period of the anti-terrorism war (Said, 2002: 14-15). This is a clear example of how Orientalism as a political doctrine works.

Figure 12. Re-presentation Process

Now we see more detail for the textualizing process of Orientalism. Said focuses on the role of the Orientalist. This group of intellectual has a position for the interpreter of the Orient. As the figure 12 shows, when the Orientalist (observer) encounters new information or culture in the field, their eyes catch only mysteriousness or strange aspects. Therefore the response on the whole will be conservative and defensive. Said explained that it is perfectly natural for the human mind to resist the untreated strangeness (Said, 1978: 67). With this natural response, Orientalist starts to judge it by his own bias and create stereotype image. During the process, Orientalist picks up what they want to tell from the various Oriental realities. Thus, it can be said that receiving information not as they are but as they ought to be; therefore, raw reality is changed from free-floating objects into units of knowledge (Said,

[74] Said, E. W. (1978) *Orientalism*, New York: Vintage Books.

1978: 67). As a result of the process, the Orient is not the same Orient anymore. It is orientalized by the Orientalist. In other words, the Orient is not merely represented as "natural" depictions of the Orient, but it is "*re-presented*" (Said, 1978: 21).

This function of *re-presentation* also works in interview research. Because researchers have already imagined the responds by their bias or purpose, the voice from responders is distorted by these effects. At this point, interview discourse is created. During the interviewing research, we cannot ignore this mechanism of creating discourse.

4.3. Conducting
4.3.1. Destinations

For conducting my fieldwork, I chose three destinations. The first one was Las Palmas of the Gran Canary Islands in Spain. It is located right in front of Laayoune, the capital of Western Sahara. There are three main reasons for choosing Las Palmas. Firstly, here, we can encounter various people who are related to the Western Sahara problem; 1) Sahrawi from Moroccan controlled region (Western Sahara and the southern part of Morocco), 2) Sahrawi from Tindouf, and 3) Moroccans. Secondly, people can discuss on the issue freely. They do not have to feel pressure from their authority, particularly, Moroccan police or security force. And thirdly, most of the people have lived outside of the conflict regions; therefore, I presume that they have more objective views toward the issue. Hence, Las Palmas was considered as a "meeting point" for this research.

The next destination was Laayoune in Western Sahara. It is the capital of Western Sahara and has 95 per cent of the whole population of the province, 241,045 in 2010.[75] According to a Spanish Census in 1974, it was only 29,010 (Hodges, 1983: 131). This large growth shows the fact that Moroccan immigration increased after 1975. Even though we can see the United Nations presence, Laayoune is economically and administratively controlled by Moroccan authority. For example, the photos below describe how Sahrawi residence areas in the center of Laayoune were treated by the government. In 2007, it was said there were almost 5,000 Sahrawi living under "slum" conditions (as image 2 shows) in the city (Heya, 2011: 19). However, the area was completely broken down in 2009 (image 3). According to local people, the residents were given some land and money to build new houses by the government and had to move away. Now in 2013, although most of the areas still remains as empty space, some villas and schools have been built (image 4). Laayoune is understood as the most "heated" place of the conflict, because of the direct daily contact between Moroccan authority and Sahrawi. Also most of the clashes between them happened in Laayoune area.

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[75] Royaume du Maroc Ministére de la Santé (3/5/2013):
http://www.sante.gov.ma/Departements/DPRF/OffreSoinsJuin07/FichiesPDF/DonneesDetaill
ees/RepertoireOffreSoins/02-4-ProvLaayoune.pdf

The Gdim Izik Camp problem (one of the largest clashes after 1975) in 2010 is still fresh in their memory. Above all, I decided to visit Laayoune because of the complex character of the city.

Image 2. In 2007   Image 3. In 2009

Image 4. In 2013

My Final destination was one of the historical cities in Morocco, Marrakech. Marrakech Province is the fourth biggest populated area in Morocco and it has 1,063, 415 inhabitants in 2004.[76] It is located almost in the middle of Moroccan territory and is also known as a gate city for traveling to Atlas and Sahara. Because of this geographical reason and size of the city, I could encounter various intellectuals who have high education, work with administration sector or have knowledge about the issue.

In addition to all, I was also planning to visit Tindouf refugee camp (which is located at southwestern Algeria) to obtain broader information from the Polisario side. However, due to the security concern, particularly just after the incident of the Tiguentourine gas plant

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[76] Royaume du Maroc　Haut-Commissariat Plan (7/5/2014):
http://www.hcp.ma/Recensement-general-de-la-population-et-de-l-habitat-2004_a633.html

attack in January, 2013,[77] I had to cancel the trip.

4.3.2. Recruiting: Formal or Socio-emotional Styles

As we have already discussed above, the recruiting will one of the most important factors to produce the interview data. Here I explain how I recruited participants with the reference of formal and socio-emotional styles.

Wil Dijkstra, Lieneke Van Der Veen and Johannes Zouwen mention two styles of interviewing setting; one is formal interview and the other is socio-emotional style of interview (Dijkstra, Veen and Zouwen, 1985: 54). According to them, socio-emotional style of interviewing is based on everyday social conversation which is often established by personal relationship (Dijkstra, Veen and Zouwen, 1985: 38). Compared to formal interview, socio-emotional style of interviewing can give respondents more opportunity to talk about sensitive issues. Alan Bryman also points out the conversation analysis based on the talk in naturally occurring situations. Talk is not "mere" representation of the social world, but also here-and-now context of immediately preceding talk (Bryman, 2001: 523).

Since my research topic has very sensitive aspects of on-going political issue, I used socio-emotional style of interviewing in sensitive situation, particularly when I discuss with strangers. On the other hand, I set formal interviews with the respondents whom I have known since my first fieldwork in 2007 or their acquaintances. I made five interviews based on every day conversation and eight formal interviews.

4.3.3. Composition of the Focus Groups

Now I explain the composition of the groups. How many participants will compose a group? Who will be participants? Do they already know each other before or not?

Although an orthodoxy emerging from the market research literature stipulates that the ideal number of participants is between eight and twelve, this number is considered too large for many sociological studies (Kitzinger & Barbour, 1999: 8). Morgan suggests six or even fewer participants for a group when the participants have strong feelings about the topic or the topic is complex (Morgan, 1998b: 73). Smaller groups have the advantage of giving the participants an increased opportunity to express themselves and produce reactions to what others say, even though the responsibility on each participant increases compared to larger

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[77] A total of 37 foreign hostages from eight different countries, along with 11 Algerian workers, were killed by the Al-qaeda linked group on a gas facility in southern Algeria in middle of January in 2013. According to Al-Jazeera, the purpose of the attack was retaliation against Christians who kill their brothers in Mali and Afghanistan and plunder their resources. Al-Jazeera Internet New from 22nd of January, 2013 (7/5/2013): http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2013/01/20131215502836355.html

groups. According to my research purpose, I focused on local people (both Sahrawi and Moroccan) who were deeply involved with the topic and also emotionally caught up in the issue. I expected that the participants needed a lot of time to express their feelings and ideas, and at the same time, the moderator must control to not heat up the discussion. Therefore, I decided to compose smaller group with two to three participants in each group.

Also deciding on the right number of groups is a matter of research question. If the responses are more diverse, we must approach to larger number of groups to hear different thoughts. Morgan said reaching a point of "theoretical saturation" is a basic concept in qualitative research. According to him, theoretical saturation is "a process of adding cases until you have uncovered the full range of what there is to observe. The actual number of cases is less important than the sense of having fully covered of saturated the topic of study. Saturation is achieved when new cases no longer yield new information" (Morgan, 1998b: 78). I used this guiding principle in my study. I started to figure out some points of theoretical saturation after conducting several interviews, even though there were many different points of view among the same category of the groups. I have conducted five focus groups and eight individual interviews.

Focus groups require comfort with interactionist perspectives. It basically depends on the group design. Particularly when the topic has sensitive aspects, it is important to select homogenous participants, because the sensitivity of responses to the context of focus groups might raise concern about response validity (Short, 2006: 108). Thus, Barbour and Kitzinger discuss that bringing together participants on the basis of some shared experience and stressful life event is productive (Barbour & Kitzinger, 1999: 8). The most common demographic characteristics for determining group composition are gender, ethnicity, age, education level, occupation, income and family composition (Morgan, 1998b: 60). According to these characteristics, in the Western Sahara case, the researcher should design focus groups with the same ethnic identity who also have a common background; therefore, I designed the groups as below:

1)   Sahrawi who have lived in Western Sahara since Spanish colonial time: Composed by family background
2)   Sahrawi who is living in Las Palmas: Composed by both family and friends
3)   Sahrawi and Moroccan who are living in Las Palmas: Composed by friends
4)   Moroccan who live in Marrakech, in Morocco: Composed by friends

Furthermore, the participants feared pressure by the police or opponent forces in on-going social contact after the research. It is also important to create a safe atmosphere for the disclosure of sensitive or thoughts. Clare Farquhar discusses that working with pre-existing groups would maximize participant safety (Farquhar, 1999: 53). If we consider

the topic and social conditions, using pre-existing groups would protect their privacy within the communities. Although the purpose of representing diversity within the community would be challenged, I decided for safety reason to compose groups with members who had already known each other.

4.3.4. The Role of Moderator

The role of moderator (including translator) is a key point in managing the discussion and reaching useful data. Kitzinger and Barbour suggest that the moderator must have 1) prior knowledge of the language, gestures, discourse and cultural meanings of the participants; 2) preparation for sensitive moments; 3) skill to create more dynamic situation of a focus group discussion (Kitzinger & Barbour, 1999: 13). According to these suggestions, the moderator must have not only sufficient knowledge of the issue itself, but also of the socio-cultural background of the participants. For example, what word should I choose to describe the territory of Western Sahara? Is it an 'occupied area by Morocco' or 'part of Moroccan territory'? The choise should depend on whom I discussed with. The reaction of the participants sometimes made it necessary to change the word.

There is also another example of the importance of the language skill. Even though the difference between the word 'Western Sahara' and 'Moroccan Sahara' is very clear in English, it is not quite so in Arabic. Western Sahara is called 'الصحراء الغربية' (A-SSaHara al-gharbiya)' in Arabic. On the other hand, Moroccan Sahara is translated 'الصحراء المغربية' (A-SSaHara al-magharibiya)'. The difference is only "م (ma)"; however, الغرب (al-gharb) means "the West" and Morocco in Arabic is المغرب (al-magharib) which also means "sunset". Thus, this small difference can create a huge misunderstanding of one's idea of the Western Sahara problem. Thus, the moderator must have deep knowledge of both the issue and its background, particularly the high language skill and flexibility toward reactions of participants.

4.3.5. Topic and Materials

The main goal for this research was figuring out the political opinion and national identity of the local people. For obtaining this goal, I set two main topics here. The first one was simply asking the respondents to describe the Western Sahara issue; both the current situation and its future status. The key topics of the conversation were a cancellation of the ferry boat from Las Palmas to Tarfaya and the Gdim Izik Camp incident. Naviera Armas launched a new ferry service from Las Palmas to Laayoune on 20th of June in 2010.[78]

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[78] Ferry Line.com (4/5/2013):
http://www.ferrylines.com/en/archive/archive-list/details/artikel/naviera-armas-expands-servi

However, after the Gdim Izik Attack, the route has been closed. Because these two events had an impact on the local people and their daily life, it made it easier to get attention from respondents as a warming up topic.

Secondly, there is one photo which describes "*Allah, al-waTan and al-malik* (The God, the nation and the King)", which was taken by the researcer in Layounne. These words can be seen in most of the cities in the Moroccan controlled region. "The God" and "the King" are easy to understand, but what is "*al-waTan*"? I presumed this word gave different meanings to each person. Did it indicate "Moroccan nation" or "Sahrawi nation"? Or could it be "Arabic nation" or "Berber nation"? I focused on what idea the respondents had about the word *"al-waTan"*.

Image 5. *"Allah, al-waTan and al-malik* (The God, the nation and the King)" in Laayoune

4.4. Chapter Summary: For the Successful Fieldwork

After discussing the methodological aspects of my research, I now conclude with the analysis on advantages and disadvantages of the interviewing method. As I have already discussed, interview data can be seen as *vox populi*. However, the data are produced by exactly *that situation* with *those participants* who have their own individual historical background. Therefore, the data cannot be used as a synecdochic source, but as a case-by-case data. We should recognize this point as a limitation for the interview method.

On the other hand, the voice from respondents can be a clue to understand the issue.

Even though the ordinary "self" is not totally free from the putative agent, the researcher can encounter respondents' feelings behind the words through direct eye-to-eye contact among the participants. In this process, how to judge the information from respondents will have an influence over the result. Shintaro Yoshimura points out three basic points of being a fieldworker; to have 1) high school level of local language skill, 2) sufficient knowledge of social background, and 3) a direct sensitivity "cold passion" (Yoshimura, 2009: 18-19). With these three skills, the researchers are able to obtain the data, and to judge with objective view against bias. Above all, before going to the field, the researcher must have enough knowledge and strong interests in the topic. The success of the fieldwork is depends on these preparation.

"The barking of a dog does not disturb the man on a camel" an Arabic proverb

Chapter 5. Data and Analysis: Dilemma between Moroccan Citizenship and Sahrawi National Identity

This is the chapter analyzes the data gathered during fieldwork. First, I discuss the role of citizenship in a multinational state. As we have already seen in chapter 3, nation does not always correspond with state, rather most states are composed of multi-nations. It could be an autonomous condition within a state. T. K. Oommen stated that:

> [T]he idea of citizenship as an instrument of equality poses far fewer problems in homogeneous states in which it is fused with nationality. We need the concept of citizenship precisely because it is different from nationality and ethnicity. Citizenship provides the non-national ethnic and minority populations in a multi-national state with a sense of belonging and security (Oommen, 1997: 28).

According to this statement, citizenship is based on a common civil right within a state or a multi-national state. For example, some Sahrawi who have Moroccan citizenship may claim Sahrawi national identity, instead of Moroccan one. Now, I will describe the relationship between citizenship and national identity (nationality) in the case of Sahrawi.

The passport plays a significant role in this context. In general understanding, people could not travel without a passport which is a certification of one's nationality. However, people in Western Sahara have lived in the non-self-governmental territory. What kind of passport do they obtain when they need to go abroad? What is their nationality? I will try to answer those questions with the case of Aminatou Haidar. Next, due to the uncertain situation and lack of clear future of Western Sahara, the Sahrawi people start to seek "better life" on their own. In this process, some people enjoy citizen right as Moroccans while they refuse Moroccan illegal occupation and claim for total independence of Western Sahara. The situation was well described by the Moroccan King. He said "there is no room for ambiguity or deceit /…/ [o]ne is either a patriot, or a traitor."[79] I focus on the meaning of "to be a patriot or a traitor" with referring the Sahrawi's opinion which I encountered in my field work.

Also, related to these questions, I point out a dilemma in the Sahrawi nation unity. Thirty-eight years of Sahrawi's diaspora might provide different ideas of the future status of Western Sahara to the population in Laayoune and Tindouf. At this point, although they have kept a common national identity as Sahrawi, they might not share a common national goal. I try to discover the different political goals within Sahrawi national unity here. Finally, I conclude this chapter with the discussion of what the nation (*al-Watani*) means for Sahrawis. To avoid further conflict, achieving independence, and maintain unity of Sahrawi, what will individual Sahrawi find be gained through a solution of the conflict? I will discuss the dilemma within the context of Sahrawi national unity.

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[79] Speech by HM the King on the occasion of the Green March, 9th of November in 2009 (9/5/2013): http://www.corcas.com/

5.1. Passport and National Identity

The passport is "the key to crossing international space because it connects the individual to a sovereign state and the citizen to a nation" (Salter, 2003: 143). The function of the passport is not only as a travel document at the border control, but also as "a determinant of nationality" (Salter, 2003: 158). Except refugee passport, if the person has Japanese passport, it is automatically understood that he or she has Japanese nationality. This is a general understanding of the function of the passport and nationality.

However, there are some cases which this function does not work in. For instance, the territory of Western Sahara internationally classifies as a "non-self-governing territory" and Moroccan sovereignty over the territory is not recognized by any states. Nevertheless, as it is known widely, Morocco administers the Western Sahara territory as if it were part of Morocco. Therefore, as a matter of course, Moroccan authority issues passports for the population who live in the territory. The problem here is the authority, which does not have its sovereignty of the territory recognized by the international society, has issued the document – a passport - which has international functions for its population. Hence, the situation produces contradiction.

In this section, we will discuss what kinds of national identity the population has, while referring my data from the fieldwork and the case of Aminatou Haidar.

5.1.1. Where are you from?

During field research, we usually introduce ourselves when we encounter the informants. One of the basic questions is "where are you from?" Although this question is widely used for general daily conversation, it has a special meaning behind it, because the answer for the question is linked to national identity –which country the person feels to belong to. I have collected five cases about this question. The conversations were kept in *Darija* (Moroccan Arabic).

Before going to the detail, I would like to explain how I recognize them as Sahrawi. In most of the cases, their traditional clothes, *Melhfa* and *Dara*, identify themselves as Sahrawi. For example, I could recognize the boy in the first case below as a Sahrawi because he was with his mother who wore Melhfa.

1) A nine years Sahrawi boy who lives in Las Palmas, and is originally from Laayoune
   The interviewer: *"Where are you from?"*
   The respondent: *"I am from Morocco."*
   The interviewer: *"Which city in Morocco are you from?"*
   The respondent: *"I am from Laayoune."*

2) A Sahrawi woman who lives in Las Palmas with Spanish nationality, and is originally from Sidi Ifni

> The interviewer: *"Where are you from?"*
>
> The respondent: *"I am from Morocco."*
>
> The interviewer: *"Which city in Morocco are you from?"*
>
> The respondent: *"I am from Sidi Ifini."*

3) A Sahrawi taxi driver who studies in Rabat, and is originally from Laayoune

> The interviewer: *"Where are you from?*
>
> The respondent: *"I am <u>ORIGINALLY</u> from Laayoune, I am a Sahrawi."* (He emphasized the word "originally").

4) A Sahrawi man who lives in Laayoune

> The interviewer: *"Could you give me your address?"*
>
> The respondent: He wrote the name of the country *"Sahara"*. Then he smiled and crossed the word. After that, he re-wrote *"Morocco"*.

5) A Sahrawi woman who lives in Las Palmas with her family, is originally from Laayoune

> The interviewer: *"Where are you from?"*
>
> The respondent: *"I am from Sahara. I am a Sahrawi."*
>
> After a short time, she wanted to introduce her Moroccan friend to a Norwegian woman. She said, *"He comes from OUR country."*

About the first case, the boy has Moroccan national identity even though he is from Laayoune in Western Sahara. He seems to have the view that Laayoune is a part of Morocco. In the second case, the respondent also does not have any doubt about her nationality. She identifies herself as a Moroccan. In the third and the forth cases, it is clear that they do not want to classify themselves as Moroccans, rather they show their identity belong to Sahrawi. The last case is more interesting. Even though she has a particular identity as a Sahrawi, she seems to express a kind of "brotherhood" feeling towards the Moroccans. The word, *"our,"* which she used, shows that there are some sorts of common identity between Moroccan and Sahrawi. This case shows one's national identity could be shifted depending on the situation or whom you talk with.

We can say here that each Sahrawi has his/her own identity and an idea of national belonging. Moreover, as in the last case, the categorization of national identity might change because it has a multi-dimensional character. National identity can be combined with class, religion and ethnic categories; therefore, when the woman used the word *"our"*, she might be

categorized herself with religious aspect, instead of political one. Taking this multi-dimensional character of national identity into consideration, now I go more into detail of the case of Aminatou Haidar which shows the complicated condition for Sahrawi's national identity in Western Sahara.

5.1.2. The Case of Aminatou Haidar

In connection with passports and national identity, the case of Aminatou Haidar is illustrative. It created international attention towards the Western Sahara issue. Aminatou Haidar, who has been nicknamed "Gandhi of Sahara",[80] is a Human Rights activist in Western Sahara. She conducted a-34-days hunger strike (from the 15th of November to the 17th of the December in 2009) at the Spanish airport of Lanzarote in Canary Islands. Why did she sacrifice her comfort for such a long time? What was her message?

Haidar was born in 1967 in Akka in Tata province (the former Spanish Protectorate zone of Morocco), and moved to Laayoune in 1976 after her father's death.[81] According to an anthropologist, Vivian Solana, Haidar's father had been assassinated by the Moroccan security forces (Solana, 2011: 59). Haidar herself had been jailed for three years and seven months with more than 400 Sahrawis on the eve of the arrival of a United Nations delegation to Laayoune in 1987 (Haidar, 2007: 347). Furthermore, she was tortured in public and arrested again on 17 of June in 2005 with a group of nine Sahrawi human rights defenders and dozens of conscientious objectors, after a peaceful *Intifada* of the Sahrawis which occurred in the previous month (Haidar, 2007: 348). She was sentenced to seven months imprisonment. Haidar is the President of the Collective of Sahrawi Human Rights Defenders (CODESA) and known as one of the main promoters of the Sahrawi civil resistance movement. Because of her activities, she was awarded the Robert F. Kennedy Human Rights Award in 2008 and the Civil Courage Award by the John Trian Foundation in 2009.

Since Haidar has obtained a Moroccan passport in 2004, she has been abroad several times. When she comes back from abroad, she usually has written "Sahrawi" on the nationality box of the landing card at the Moroccan airport, instead of "Moroccan" (Solana, 2011: 59). However, on her way back from the United States, where she received the human rights award, she was intercepted by Moroccan security officials at Laayoune airport. Because she declined to stop advocating for self-determination for the people of Western Sahara, she was asked to sign a police statement to renounce Moroccan citizenship, and her passport and identification documents were confiscated. Then, the security officials decided to put her on a flight to Lanzarote in the Canary Islands and expelled her from Western Sahara without a

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[80] BBC News, 2nd of December, 2009 (19/05/2013): http://news.bbc.co.uk/

[81] El PAÍS, 13th of December, 2009 (19/05/2013): http://elpais.com/

passport.[82] At the same time, the pilot was told by a Moroccan Commander that "[t]he Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs is informed and has approved the decision (Solana, 2011: 60)". As a matter of fact, the Spanish authorities allowed her to enter the country, but they did not accept her to exit from there without a passport, even though Haidar desired to go back home. This is the cause why she decided to go on a hunger strike.

According to Agence Maghreb Arabe Press (MAP), Haidar "refused, upon her arrival at the airport, to provide information on her identity, residence and nationality, as required in the international regulations".[83] Furthermore, Moroccan Foreign Minister, Taieb Fassi-Fihri said that Haidar "has to bear the consequences of her actions; she has renounced and willingly signed away her Moroccan citizenship/…/ (she) has benefited from her national passport for years, has willingly decided to return her Moroccan passport and national identity card".[84] In fact, Haidar holds Moroccan citizenship and a Moroccan passport. Seeing from a Moroccan situation, providing a passport to its citizen means that Moroccan government as a sovereign state gives the citizen to link directly to the sovereign's internationally legal identity and protect her as a Moroccan citizen; therefore, there is no question for its nationality. The citizen who has a Moroccan passport holds a Moroccan nationality. As Mark B. Salter discuss, "[t]he question of nationality was brought into sharp focus by the passport, which is the documentary trace of governmental control over its population (Salter, 2003: 152)". Thus, the government concluded to confiscate Haidar's passport because of her denial of Moroccan nationality and citizenship. For the Moroccan government, Haidar is a "separatist" who brings a risk for the "territorial integrity" of the Moroccan nation.

On the other hand, Haidar's hunger strike reminds of the responsibility as a former colonial authority of Western Sahara to the Spanish government. Haidar told to Spanish newspaper *El País*, "[i]n 1975 Spain made a mistake because it did not anticipate the determination of the Sahrawi People. In 2009 they have made a mistake again because they don't know Aminetu Haidar" (Solana, 2011: 57). What kind of mistake did Spain make again? Firstly, Spanish authority made a contradiction on the arrival of Haidar. Although they admitted her into the territory against her will and carried no passport, Haidar was not allowed to go back to her home because she did not have a passport. According to the Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human rights, "[e]veryone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country".[85] If Spanish government would follow the declaration, they should send Haidar back home. The second, because of the impasse of the situation (at the moment, the Moroccan authority claims that only if Haidar apologizes, they

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[82] Amnesty International, 17th of November, 2009 (20/05/2013): http://www.amnesty.org/en/
[83] MAP, 13th of November, 2009 (15/05/2013): http://www.thefreelibrary.com/
[84] Maghrebia, 8th of December, 2009 (19/05/2013): http://maghrebia.com/en_GB/
[85] The United Nation Webpage: The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (6/6/2013): http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/

will provide her with a new passport),[86] the Spanish authority decided to offer Spanish nationality to her. However, Haidar refused this offer and demanded her original passport back.[87] Providing a new nationality and a citizenship –making an exception against the international legal system– do not solve the problem. What Haidar desires is not a new nationality, she wants to show the world what kinds of contradiction and illegal situation have existed for more than 30 years in a supposedly democratic country, and how people are blind of the fact. She rather claims the justice to exercise Sahrawi's right of self-determination as the United Nations promised.

After a month of hunger strike, finally Haidar was allowed to leave Spain without a passport and went back to her home in Laayoune. Due to the international pressure on Morocco, especially from the United State and France which unofficially support Moroccan occupation, the Moroccan authority had to compromise their strategy (Zunes, 2008: 1).

Above all, we can say that the contradictory situation in Western Sahara produces a confusion of national identity. As we see in Haidar's case, she demands her Moroccan passport because Morocco is the "actual" administrative power over the Western Sahara territory, even though it is not recognized as an international legal subject. On the other hand, Sahrawi people are still waiting to exercise their right of self-determination which is promised by the United Nations. In fact, if Sahrawi people who live in Western Sahara want to go abroad, the only option is to obtain the Moroccan passport as its national identification.[88] At this point, the contradiction occurs. Next we will see how this confusing situation influences the people's identities.

5.2. "Play with Two Strings"

Moroccan King Mohammed VI said in his address to the nation at the 34th anniversary of the Green March that "there is no room for ambiguity or deceit: either a person is Moroccan or not /…/ [o]ne is either a patriot, or a traitor. There is no halfway house. One cannot enjoy the rights and privileges of citizenship, only to abuse them and conspire with the enemies of the homeland."[89] This speech of the King is considered to be a trigger for the Aminatou Haidar's case. The message is very clear that either you are a Moroccan who supports the national unity or not. During the fieldwork, one of my informants told me that

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[86] .BBC News; Morocco demands apology from hunger strike activist (7/5/2013): http://news.bbc.co.uk/

[87] BBC News, (19/05/2013): http://news.bbc.co.uk/

[88] The National Center of Documents Production of SADR in Tindouf has been produced Sahrawi passport, which is available for diplomats, students and patients who need to be treated in a country that recognizes the SADR. Sahara Press Service, 8th of September in 2012 (8/5/2013) http://allafrica.com/

[89] Speech by HM the King on the occasion of the Green March, 9th of November in 2009 (9/5/2013): http://www.corcas.com/

"Some Sahrawi, especially from the north (Tarfaya region), play with two strings". According to him, the saying "play with two strings" means that these Sahrawis could be "Moroccans" or "Sahrawis" depending on the situation. Likewise according to the King's speech, one cannot enjoy the rights of citizenship while at the same time supporting the independence of Western Sahara. In short, one is playing both Moroccan citizenship and Sahrawi national identity. Here we will analyze the example of the above situation which I encountered in the field.

5.2.1. *Melhfa* as a Tool

Melhfa is a traditional cloth for Sahrawi woman. It is four meters long by one meter wide piece of texture which has often beautiful colorful pattern or sometimes simply designed with one color. Because of those special characters, it is very easy to recognize (image 6). It also has a role in identifying women as belonging to the Sahrawi ethnic group (Rguibi & Belehsen, 2006: 619). On the contrary, Moroccan women traditionally wear the cloth which is called "*Jilbabun*". This gives visual difference between Sahrawi and Moroccan women and it is easy to identify each other which the ethnic group she belongs to.

Image 6. Melhfa and Dara

According to my interview, this melhfa can be a tool in some situations. This is a conversation from one focus group interview in Las Palmas. These two women are Sahrawis from Sidi Ifni who wear melhfa and hold Moroccan passports.

The respondent 1: *"People in Las Palmas are very kind to Sahrawi. If I wear Melhfa to go*

to the hospital, they will give me priority. I even do not have to wait for a long line."

The respondent 2: *"Especially after 2010 (Gdeim Izik incident), Spanish people here feel sympathy to Sahrawi. If they see a woman with Melhfa, they are kind to us."*

Because Melhfa visually gives their identification, people will judge the person as they look like. Related to this topic, on the contrary, here is another example how people judge Moroccans in Las Palmas. This is one conversation between one Chinese man who was living in the Canary Islands and one Moroccan man.

Chinese man: *"Where are you from?"*
Moroccan man: *"I am from Morocco."*
Chinese man: *"Do you have Sahara?"*
Moroccan man: *"Yes, we have Sahara."*
Chinese man: *"You are a politician."*

According to this conversation, it seems like the Chinese man has some kind of stereo type idea about Moroccans. His meaning sounds like Moroccan people, who think Sahara is their territory, are all politicians who take part in an illegal occupation. Another Moroccan informant, who has lived in Las Palmas for more than seven years, describes the local people as "racist" because of their attitude toward Moroccans. It seems that ordinary life in Las Palmas has been already politicized for both Moroccan and Sahrawi.

The Canary Islands are located just outside of Western Sahara and also the place where Aminatou Haidar had her hunger strike. Because of this geographical location and Spanish responsibility on the colonial issue, local people's sympathies are attuned toward the Western Sahara problem. This situation produces some sorts of pro-Sahrawi and anti-Moroccan atmosphere; therefore, Melhfa and Jilbabun, which are visual items to show their belongings, could be a tool for some occasions.

5.2.2. For a Better Life

Next we discuss one example of the some Sahrawis who move between Laayoune in Western Sahara and Tindouf refugee camp in Algeria. Because of mines at the border area between Algeria and Western Sahara, the movement to cross the border has a lot of risk. However, according to an informant, it is possible to pass through Mauritania, and some Sahrawis move from Laayoune to Tindouf, and the reverse is also possible. Why do they choose to exile?

In 2008, the Moroccan authorities designated 20,000 plots of land for distribution to the Sahrawis, based on tribal and electoral calculations (Boukhars & Amar, 2011: 229). Related to this announcement, one of the informants points out the reason for the exile.

The respondent: *"The (Moroccan) government gives 700,000MAD to the Sahrawis who come back from Tindouf. This brings up a big confusion. Some Sahrawis (who live in Laayoune) exile to Tindouf for a couple of years, then they return to Laayoune for obtaining this offer from the Moroccan government. This is a big mistake made by the government. The situation is chaos."*

According to the above statement, some Sahrawis exile to Tindouf for getting the offer from the Moroccan government after their returning. Due to the high rate of unemployment, lack of housing capacity and daily necessities in Laayoune,[90] the people there are struggling for the life. Thus, it is no wonder if they chose condition as "Sahrawis who defect from the Polisario" to achieve "better life".

Mahjoub Salek, a leading member of Khat as-Shahid,[91] left the refugee camp for Morocco and was viewed as an exile. He told to the *Tel Quel* (Moroccan news magazine) that "(Moroccan) King VI has shown far greater interest in the welfare of the Sahrawi people" (Campbell, 2010: 579). He is not the only exile from the refugee camp, but other high-level leaders have also defected over the years. For example, Ahmadou Soilem, who was a personal advisor to the Polisario Secretary General Mohammed Abdelaziz, left Tindouf in 2009 because of disillusionment with the Polisario leadership and unbearable conditions in the camps.[92] The Moroccan authority "offers safe haven and incentives –both economic and political– for Sahrawis who defect from the Polisario. Sahrawis who support Morocco's autonomy plan are given positions in Moroccan-based organizations, as well as in the Moroccan parliament itself."[93] Needless to say, even though there are various reasons for the political exile, we might not deny that their desires "to have a better life" decide their destinations.

Now I will come back to the phrase "play with two strings". Under the thirty-eight-year of unsolved conflict, the people are frustrated, disappointed and tired of the situation. Although they have s strong will to achieve their right of self-determination, some

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[90] The unemployment rate in Laayoune province stood at 25 per cent in 2001/2002, and 27 per cent in Smara (the local people in Smara believe it to be more like 45 per cent) (Shelly, 2004: 90).

[91] Khat as-Shahid is a militant nationalist organization in the Sahrawi refugee camp. It advocated in the refugee camps for government reform and a recommitment to national struggle for independence. Particularly, it claims renewed armed conflict (Campbell, 2010: 574).

[92] Organization for Statehood & Freedom (1/6/2013): http://www.statehoodandfreedom.org/en/the-saharawi-stuggle/polisario-defections

[93] *Ibid.*

Sahrawi utilize double national identities, as Moroccans and as Sahrawis, to obtain their own goals in life. The respondents in Las Palmas prefer to wear Melhfa to get attention from the local population, even though they identify themselves as Moroccans. Furthermore, some political exiles are crossing the border to obtain their personal benefit, rather for political reasons. It seems that one's personal goal is the main criterion to decide his/her destination, not national interest. In this case, nationalism is not always the most important. In the next section I will discuss how this dilemma of the national identity issue affects the ethnic identity as Sahrawi.

5.3. Dilemma of National Identity: Battle and Peace between the Families

Since Spain terminated their colonial rule in Western Sahara in 1975, Sahrawis are divided in their destinies. According to Tony Hodges, less than 40-50,000 Sahrawis were living in Moroccan territory by 1974, and 73,497 Sahrawis in Western Sahara area were counted in the census of the same year (Hodges, 1983b: 35 &49). Among these numbers, approximately 50,000 Sahrawis took refuge in Tindouf after Morocco and Mauritania occupied the territory (Hodges, 1983a: 233). At the same time, the rest of the population remained under Moroccan (and Mauritanian) controlled zone in Western Sahara. As I mention before, since Morocco built the "sand wall", it has been restricted to cross the border between Western Sahara and the refugee camp. Although, they are connected with internet or telephone line thanks to the development of technology, and in spite of the family re-unification program offered by the UNHCR nowadays,[94] their life remains geographically and politically divided. A Sahrawi diaspora has been created.

The Polisario Front, which has controlled the refugee camp since 1975, is understood as the only movement for Sahrawi nationalism.[95] Since it was established in Tindouf in 1976 the SADR, it plays a role as the representative of Sahrawi and takes part in direct negotiations with Moroccan authorities. Nevertheless, after 38 years of the diaspora, is it still possible to say that the Polisario is the only representative of Sahrawi or they have kept their national unity? Now we will discuss the dilemma among the Sahrawis.

5.3.1. Laayoune versus Tindouf?

During fieldwork, I often heard from the informants about a confrontation between

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[94] UNHCR launched an expanded program of visits for long-separated Sahrawi families in the Tindouf refugee camp and in the Western Sahara in 2012. So far over 12,800 people have visited family members. UNHCR Webpage (4/6/2013): http://www.unhcr.org/4f859e906.html
[95] According to Tony Hodges, the Polisario congress declared that "the Sahrawi people have no alternative but to struggle until wresting independence, their wealth and their full sovereignty over their land (Hodges, 1983a: 163)."

Sahrawis in Laayoune and Tindouf. As we already have discussed above, the informant who mentioned "play with two strings", shows a negative idea of the Sahrawis who live in the southern part of Morocco and agree with Moroccan authority. Here are other examples;

1) A focus group composed of two Sahrawis women; a grandmother (the respondent 1) and her granddaughter (the respondent 2) from Sidi Ifni in Las Palmas

> The respondent 1: *"We do not have a good relationship with Sahrawis in Tindouf, they do not like us."*

> The respondent 2: *"Not all, some people (from Tindouf) are polite. We talk normal. But after the demonstration (related with the Gdeim Izik attack) in 2010 in Las Palmas, the situation changed little bit. Anyway, we (young generation) are not so interested in this problem anymore. I talk normal with both Moroccans and Sahrawis."*

2) A focus group composed of two Sahrawis women; one is forty-seven-year-old (the respondent 1) and her friend around sixty-year-old (the respondent 2) from Laayoune in Las Palmas.

> The respondent 1: *"There is a confrontation between Sahrawis in Tindouf and Laayoune. We say "hello" to each other, not more. We are basically divided because of the political opinions."*

> The interviewer: *"What is the cause for the confrontation?"*

> The respondent 1: *"We (from Laayoune) think all problems come from Tindouf. This ferry boat between Las Palmas and Laayoune is a good example. It has been stopped to operate because of the illegal travelers from Tindouf. Also they (from Tindouf) think that we have a nice calm life in Laayoune. And they are struggling for the difficult life in Tindouf."*

> The respondent 2: *"The ferry operation was very convenient for us to go back home. But after the Gdeim Izik, the company decided to stop this line. The people who participate io the riot (in Laayoune in 2010) were not from Laayoune. We know the local people so well, but I have not seen them before. They are from Tindouf who come by the ferry boat (from Las Palmas). They usually make noise for our life."*

> The respondent 1: *"Like Aminatou Haidar, they (she talked about some Sahrawi from Tindouf) use the Moroccan passport for their travel. If they do not agree with the Moroccan government, why do they have to use it? They provide us the right and we just accept it. It is a life."*

As we see above, although it is difficult to determine a particular definition for the division between Sahrawis in Laayoune and Tindouf, thus it can be said there are some degrees of the confrontation. Some Sahrawis who live in Laayoune think the people in Tindouf make problems and disturb their life. On the other hand, Sahawis from Tindouf see that the people in Laayoune have "a nice life" as having their own houses, economic activities and free of movements which they cannot attain in the refugee camp. In fact, as the respondent 1 in the second focus group said, if the person agree or at least accept to the Moroccan rule on the Western Sahara, or even just obtain a legal status as a Moroccan, for Sahrawis in Laayoune it is possible to live as "Moroccans" and enjoy officially provided equal civil rights with Moroccans. However, the life in the refugee camp is very harsh. Tindouf is not propitious for either animal husbandry or agriculture on a scale which could provide more than a small fraction of the refugee's food needs, therefore, almost all supplies have to be brought in by truck from a huge distance (Hodges, 1983a: 233). Thus, the SADR affirms that "private property is guaranteed and organized by law", "the market economy and freedom of enterprise will be recognized" only "after the full achievement of national sovereignty" (Pham, 2010: 15). The huge difference here is they do not have freedom of activities or movements. Although the refugee camp has highly organized health, education and administration areas (Lippert, 1987: 48), the only thing that they can do is to wait for the resolution in the middle of the great desert.

This gap between Laayoune and Tindouf might bring a person's views in different directions. For example, on the one hand, Aminatou Haidar is considered as "a symbol of a nation for Sahrawis",[96] but on the other hand, as the respondent 1 in the second group above thinks Haidar is using the right to be a Moroccan citizen. Furthermore, we might point out the gap between generations. As focus group 1 shows, in contradiction to the grandmother, the granddaughter does not judge to be a huge confrontation among them. Considering that, it is possible to say that there are slight gaps between the generations too. It is no wonder that the thirty-eight years of the diaspora produce another life history on each Sahrawi's hand, and depending on their own destiny, each person has his/her own view of the others.

5.3.2. The Cease-fire in the Gdeim Izik Camp

During the interviews, the informants often mentioned the Gdeim Izik issue. It seems that the incident gave a huge impact on the Sahrawis who live both in Laayoune and Tindouf. Firstly, we shall see what happened in the Gdeim Izik Camp in 2010.

The Gdeim Izik Camp is located about 15 km away from Laayoune city. At the beginning of October 2010, the demonstrators, most of them women and unemployed young

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96 Al-Jazeera: Western Sahara activist face curbs, 25 of December in 2009 (7/5/2013): http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2009/12/

men, gathered to protest the questionable management of development founds and social subsidies by the Moroccan authorities (Martín, 2012: 63). Although the Moroccan security forces did not ban the rally at the beginning, one accident –which brought the death of one Sahrawi at the check point of the camp because he was one of the passengers in the car which ignored the security control– dramatically changed the situation at the camp (Martín, 2012: 63). Despite negotiations between a committee of representatives of the camp and the Moroccan authorities, the camp was dismantled by the security force on November 8.[97] The operation took place without notice and disorder developed among those trying to run away from water cannons and tear gas, and those trying to organize resistance against the State security force. To make matters worse, the lack of information and rumors induced people to believe that a massacre had happened in the camp and this uncertain information brought up a brutal riot in the city center of Laayoune. As a result of the events, several hundred people (mostly Sahrawis) were injured and 11 members of the Moroccan security force and two Sahrawis were killed (Martín, 2012: 64). Because the events were characterized as protest against perceived social discrimination and political corruption, Noam Chomsky understands it as the "beginning of the Arab Spring".[98]

Here I will just focus on the fieldwork data about how they reached to the cease-fire in the Gdeim Izik camp. Three informants mentioned the events.

1) An individual formal interview with a Moroccan man who works for the Moroccan authority in Laayoune

The respondent: *"The police man cannot go far from the city center by himself, because they are under the risk of the opponent's attack, especially after the Gdeim Izik, which 11 police men were killed. Yes, the salary here is 1000 MAD more than the inside (the Moroccan territory), I am very tired of the pressure. I want to go back home (inside Morocco) as soon as possible."*

2) An individual informal interview with a Sahrawi man who works for the shop in Laayoune

The interviewer: *"What was the cause for the Gdeim izik?"*

The respondent: *"It is because of social, economic problem. The main purpose was to get a job, to develop social condition, not really an independent*

[97] The negotiation was reached a basic agreement on November 4. The Moroccan State pledged to address progressively the housing and employment demands of the protesters. Also the creation of a joint commission was planned; however, none of the commitments were fulfilled, though it should have been in force from November 8 (Martin, 2012: 64).

[98] The author attended the political talk given by Noam Chomsky at the University of Tromsø; "Middle East Dilemmas –Simple Solution, Difficult Obstacles" on 13th of September in 2012.

issue at the beginning."

The interviewer: *"How did the Gdeim Izik camp attack come down?"*

The respondent: *"It was not because of the Moroccan police. It was we (Sahrawi) talked each other. Sahrawi here, we do not like the police, we hate them. But the military force is different. It is mostly composed with the local Sahrawi. When the military force arrived to the camp, we talked and decided to come back to the city. We understand that the war does not bring any good results."*

3) An individual formal interview with a Sahrawi man who works for the human rights organization in Laayoune

The interviewer: *"What was the cause for the Gdeim Izik?"*

The respondent: *"There were no big plans to be like that much confusion. It was normal demonstration like other part of Morocco. Even, sometimes, there were some Dukhalā' (Moroccans) to join demonstration for unemployment and social issue. But some people use this situation and came out big incident."*

The interviewer: *"How did the confusion come down in the camp?"*

The respondent: *"The problem was ended because of our (Sahrawis) discussion, not because of the Moroccan police. The (Sahrawi) mayor (who is nominated by the King) and members of the local parliament (who are elected by the local people) had conflict. The latter ordered to some Sahrawis to go to the Gdeim Izik camp. And the former is usually with the police which we (Sahrawi) hate. When the police was in the camp, the Mayor told them to come back for the security in the city (due to the revolt), then, the military force went to the camp, instead of the police. After, the things came down."*

According to above information, we can say two things. At first, as all of the informants said, there is a deep rift between the Moroccan police and the local Sahrawis. This information falls in line with the discussion by Carmen Gómez Martín. She explains the total lack of understanding between the Moroccans and Sahrawis; "the usual political tension and the permanent feeling of injustice regarding the distribution of resources have been joined in the last year by ethnic and tribal tensions promoting dangerous racist attitudes between communities" (Martín, 2012: 70). Also Anouar Boukhars and Ali O. Amar mention that the problem of the issue is "local distrust and the government's lack of credibility" (Boukhars & Amar: 2011: 232). It can summed up with the word, *Dukhalā',* in the interview. *Dukhalā'* is plural of *Dakhil*, it means in Arabic "extraneous, not indigenous, alien, foreigner, stranger,

new comer, novice, guest" (Cowan, 1979: 316). It is used for the people who settled in the Western Sahara but not Sahrawis in this context. This word is often used in the conversation among the people in Western Sahara. It demonstrates the different identifications between *Dukhalā'* and Sahrawis. The confrontation between them has existed not only at the political level but also in the daily life level. Even if the Moroccan government suggests the autonomy under its sovereignty, the problem would not be solved unless this confrontation is solved in the local community.

Secondly, the two informants have almost the same view of the cease-fire in Gdeim Izik. Even though the trigger of the event was disagreements in the local parliament, in the end, the Sahrawis did not want to have a war among them. They decided to calm down the situation and avoid further violence. Also though there are many voices to coming back to the armed struggle in the Tindouf refugee camp,[99] until now, they have kept the status quo. Taking into account their decision as a national unity, which has been created since 1975, still keeps a strong tie.

Above all, even though the confrontation between Sahrawis in Laayoune and Tindouf demonstrated, that both sides try to not bring the dispute further. It shows that they have kept ethnic unity. However, if the topic comes to the national identity, it might be a different answer. As we saw earlier in the theory chapter, a nation can be a political community which has a goal to create its own autonomous status, but it is not always seeking for an independent state. As the second focus group on page 71 shows, some Sahrawi might accept the Moroccan sovereignty over the Western Sahara, as long as they can enjoy the same rights like other Moroccans. In this case, their national identity is shifted to the Moroccan one. On the other hand, some Sahrawi could accept the autonomous solution under Moroccan sovereignty, and others claim total independence for the Sahrawi state. In both cases, their national and ethnic identities as Sahrawi correspond; however, there is slight difference, autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty and total independence. This different political idea creates a dilemma within Sahrawi ethnic unity.

5.4. What is *al-Watan* (the Nation) for you?

According to Jonathan Wyrtzen, the official Moroccan national identity had crystallized after anti-colonial nationalist struggle as *"Allah, al-Watan, and al-Malik* (God, the Nation and the King/Sultan)"*, which centered on an Arabo-Islamic unity, an official legitimacy as a State, and the unifying symbol of the King (Wyrtzen, 2009: 4-5). Furthermore he focused on the word "the nation" and said that "[c]olonization created a "nation-sized" political and economic unit, making the "nation" a meaningful category of identity because it

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[99] Madeline Otis Campbell points out the rise of Khat as-Shahid, which is a militant nationalist organization. It has a central role of the discussions of renewed armed conflict in the refugee camp (Campbell, 2010: 574).

was directly tied to sovereignty over this unit" (Wyrtzen, 2009: 7). Morocco is a multi-ethnic country; it is composed of a significant number of *Tamazigh* population, Arab, Jewish community and Sahrawis in the south. In order to manage a "nation-size" group, which is created by colonization, the authority needed to build up a national identity among these various ethnic groups. They tried to tie the population together according to the same colonial experience; however, the strategy had not reached to cover on the Sahrawis population in Western Sahara when Morocco obtained independence in 1956. After the "re-unification" of Western Sahara in 1975, the government has been trying to integrate the Sahrawi as "Moroccan nation", but as we already have discussed, it was unsuccessful.

Above all, what is *"al-WaTan"* for the Sahrawi? In Arabic, the word "*Watan*" means "homeland, home country, fatherland, home" and "*Watani*" has means of "home, native, indigenous, domestic, patriotic, national, and nationalistic" (Cowan, 1979: 1265). Now we shall see the difference between how Moroccans feel for the *Watan* and how Sahrawis do.

5.4.1. The Cases of Moroccans

Nizar Messari said "[i]n Morocco, Sahrawis have consistently been seen as Moroccans" (Messari, 2007: 55). Likewise, Moroccan people, in general, think the Western Sahara is a part of their country. How do they reach to this idea? To get the answer, we will analyze the contexts of the Moroccan history text-book.

Here is a Moroccan junior high school national education and history text-book published by the Ministry of Education. It is used in the public school education in the country, including to the territory of Western Sahara. The text-book clearly shows the importance of national integrity and peace keeping. Firstly it tells the importance to respect the sovereignty;

ظل سلو كنا في ميدان السياسة الخارجية يتسم بعدم التدخل في الشؤون الداخلية للدول الأخرى مع احترام سيادتها
واختياراتها، والتعامل معها على مقتضى قواعد التعاون الدولي (202)

[Translation] In the foreign policy, we should not interfere with the affairs of other countries
with the respect of their sovereignty and choice. We should deal with them according to the rule
of international cooperation (Translated by the author).

We might understand from the first sentence that other countries should respect of Moroccan sovereignty and its choice of "integration" of the Western Sahara as well. Based on this rule, the text-book explains the necessity of peaceful coexistence in North Africa. It seems that Moroccan authority teaches the importance of regional cooperation, besides the Western Sahara issue (in fact, the Western Sahara problem does not exist in the context of text-book).

Table 3. Time line of Moroccan integration

Year	The recovered area	The way we recovered the territory
1956	International Conference in Tangier	International Congress in Mohmadia
1958	Tarfaya	Negotiation with Spain
1969	Sidi Ifni	Negotiation with Spain
1975	As-Saqiyat Al-Hamra (two-third of Western Sahara)	Organized "Green March" The Madrid Accord
1979	Rio de Oro (rest of the Western Sahara)	The Tribes in the Rio de Oro gave their faith to his King in Rabat

Source: The Moroccan Ministry of Education (2005) *The National Education and History Text-book*

It describes the time table of Moroccan national integrity process (table 3). According to the table 3, the national unification process has begun in 1956 when Morocco achieved independence and, in so far, it has completed with the Western Sahara in 1979. Needless to say, Western Sahara is understood as a part of the Moroccan integrity in the context. As I already have discussed in chapter 3, the Green March in 1975 is considered as a turning point of national reunification process. At this point, the authority has succeeded to create a Moroccan national identity among various ethnic unities. Thus, every November 7th (Anniversary of the Green March), the King gives a special speech (mostly about the Western Sahara issue) to his people and celebrates the honorable day for the nation.[100] Likewise, the text-book focused on the Green March and suggested to the students "put yourself as a volunteer in the Green March and tell the feeling to participate to the civic movement" (203). As a result of the education and context of the national media source, most of Moroccan students believe that Western Sahara (Moroccan Sahara for them) is a part of their national unity. Based on this aspect, I conducted interviews with some Moroccan people who had studied in the junior high school. The main questions are 1) what is a solution for the Sahara issue? 2) What is the nation for you? Here are three examples.

1) An individual formal interview with a Moroccan (*Amazigh*) girl who studies in the University of Marrakech

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[100] For the 37th anniversary of the Green March, the King said "[t]oday we are proudly celebrating the thirty-seventh anniversary of the glorious Green March, an epic national event which reflected the civilized approach chosen by Morocco to recover its Sahara. In addition to that, this truly historic achievement has provided an invaluable source of inspiration, nurturing the lofty patriotic values underpinning the symbiosis between the throne and the people, as well as the nation's unanimous, unwavering commitment to these sacred values" CORCAS webpage: His Majesty the King addresses a speech to the nation on the occasion of the 37th anniversary of the glorious Green March (9/5/2013) http://www.corcas.com/

The interviewer: *"What is a solution for the Western Sahara problem?"*

The respondent: *"We have to seek for a peaceful solution. I think autonomy (under Moroccan sovereignty) is the best solution."*

The interviewer: *"What is al-Watan for you?"*

The respondent: *"It is everything for me, like my family, my life."*

2) An individual formal interview with a Moroccan (*Amazigh*) man who studied until high school education

The interviewer: *"What is a solution for the Sahara issue?"*

The respondent: *"Sahara is our land. It is a part of the Greater Morocco. Why do they need independence?*

The interviewer: *"If there is an opportunity to participate in the "Green March", do you want to join in?*

The respondent: *"Of course."*

The interviewer: *"What is al-Watan for you?"*

The respondent: *"I do not know… it is a huge question. It is everything."*

3) An individual formal interview with a Moroccan (*Amazigh*) man who studied two years in a special school after the high school education

The interviewer: *"What is a solution for the Sahara issue?"*

The respondent: *"The autonomy (under Moroccan sovereignty) is the best for this resolution. Independence is unrealistic idea. It will be war after."*

The interviewer*: "What is al-Watan for you?"*

The respondent: *"It is from Tangier to La Gouira."*

All of the three informants consider that Western Sahara is a part of their national integrity (particularly the informant in the third case clearly said the range of the national territory); therefore, Sahrawis who live in the territory are Moroccan citizens and same as they are. It seems like the national education helps their idea toward the issue. Since they are born, the media resources, school teachers and the people around have told them "the Sahara is our territory" and they celebrate the "Green March" day every year. Thus, they do not have any questions for the status of the Moroccan government. Hence, their ideas for the nation are stable. It is based on the second Moroccan nationalism of 1975.

5.4.2. The Cases of Sahrawis

Next we will see some examples of Sahrawis who live in Laayoune. Although both of the informants grow up under the Moroccan educational system, they show different view

of the points compared to the Moroccan informants.

1) One focus group composed of one Sahrawi man (the respondent 1) and his wife (the respondent 2) who have education at university and his mother (the respondent 3)

> The respondent 1: *"We lost (the nation)… Some people get benefit from this conflict. The situation is just chaos"*
>
> The respondent 2: *(Nodding her head.)*
>
> The respondent 3: *"We are tired enough of this problem. When the riot happened in 2010, we even could not go out from house. We have enough stress. If there will be peace, we will accept the autonomy (under Moroccan sovereignty). It is very hard to build a new country. It might be the war between tribes if we get independent. To follow the actual direction is better."*

2) An individual informal interview with one Sahrawi man

> The respondent: *"We (young generation) do not feel peace for all our life. On the other hand, we become no interests (in the "nation") because the Moroccan government did not change the situation, no better life. We lost hope. We are divided"*

Comparing these examples between Moroccan and Sahrawis, the former's ideas are clearer than the latter. The Moroccan informants do not have any doubt about their national unity or identity. It is clear for them that they have Moroccan national identity and belong to Moroccan nation. Furthermore, they also consider that Sahrawi must be part of Moroccan national unity. On the contrary, The Sahrawi informants have confused feelings for the Sahrawi nation. As I discussed in section three of this chapter, they have a dilemma between autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty and total independence of Western Sahara when it comes to the discussion of the future status of the territory. This is the reason why the answer for the "nation" is automatically connected with the political status of Sahrawi nation. On the one side, though the difference between *Dukhalā'* and Sahrawis are highlighted in the occupied zone, as the informant 3 in the focus group 1 said, she will accept the autonomous condition under Moroccan sovereignty because she does not wish to see further conflict. Considering into the confrontation within the Sahrawi ethnic unity, she is afraid of another new conflict among themselves. On the other side, many Sahrawi believe that total independence as a state is the only solution for the issue (Lakhal, 2011: 50). After all, Sahrawi are confused when they encounter the topic at "nation", because they understand there is no common idea of Sahrawi political community as national unity at the moment.

5.5. Chapter Summary

After thirty-eight years of Sahrawi diaspora, we must point out their dilemma within the national unity. Firstly, it is caused by the international legal situation in Western Sahara. As we see the case of Aminatou Haidar, the contradiction between "actual" power and the international legal status of the Sahrawi nation produces a confused national identity of the people. The person, who holds a Moroccan passport, must be categorized as a Moroccan citizen; however it does not fit for the person who claims the right of self-determination of his/her own identity as well as for the Sahrawi nation. On the other hand, if the person agrees with the rule of Moroccan authority, he/she is officially entitled to enjoy the right as a Moroccan citizen, which gives him/her freedom of movement. Therefore, depending on the choice of each person, he/she can play a role as a Moroccan citizen or a Sahrawi nationalist, or even someone can switch its national identity between two of them.

Secondly, we should not ignore the confrontation between Sahrawis in Laayoune and Tindouf refugee camp. Considered on the situation in which the families are divided on both sides, of course they are eager to maintain their family ties or even the national unity. Nevertheless, after thirty-eight years of diaspora, and also the hopeless situations in both Laayoune and Tindouf –not only the local administrative corruption in Laayoune, but also a growing divergence of opinion between the authority and particularly the young generation who insist to break up the deadlock situation by the armed struggle in Tindouf– caused a split in the Sahrawi national unity. Finally, even though we can see some degrees of the ethnic unity, for instance in the case of the cease-fire process in Gdiem Izik, Sahrawis both in Laayoune and Tindouf are exhausted of the chaos situation. As a result of the situation, some of the Sahrawi accept an autonomous condition under Moroccan sovereignty, and the others claim total independence of Sahrawi state. At this point, even though Sahrawi have kept the idea of the nation as a political community, they do not have a common way to achieve it. Hence, there exists a dilemma within Sahrawi national unity.

Chapter 6. Discussion and Conclusion: For a Conflict Solution

In this chapter, I will summarize the discussion by coming back to the three questions which I suggested in the theory chapter; 1) is Sahrawi unity understood as an *ethnie* or nation?; 2) how is Sahrawi's national identity transformed?; and 3) is it possible to keep their family unit in fact despite the impact of nationalism? What kind of dilemmas do the Sahrawi have in regards to national unity? During the process, I consider both the theoretical framework in chapter 3 and fieldwork data in the chapter 5. Thereafter, taking into consideration the above questions, I will conclude and reflect on my research questions. As it is mentioned in the introduction, if the Sahrawi agree with the autonomous plan which the Moroccan government suggests, do they become Moroccans? Is it possible to say that one's political opinion could change one's "national" identity or "ethnic identity"? If the answer were yes, what is the cause to shift one's identity? It might be able to suggest a hint for the conflict resolution from these answers.

6.1.Is Sahrawi composed as an *ethnie* or a nation?

As we have already discussed in chapter 3, Smith explained that the conception of ethnicity as a central idea between a "primordial" and a "situational" qualities. A "primordial" quality is understood as one of the "given" of human existence, for example, cultural differences like religion, custom, language (Smith, 1991: 20). In this sense, people who share a religion, nomadic customs and the Hassaniya language live in a wide scope in the North African region; most of the places in Mauritania, the northern part of Mali, southwestern Algeria, Western Sahara and the south of Morocco. Despite these "primordial" factors, it is not enough to say that they compose an ethnie, because some "situational" qualities are missing at this point.

After the colonial powers defined the border without considering local "primordial" qualities, the people were divided into different colonial categories. When the people met "strangers" (colonial powers), and, when they started anti-colonial struggle, they began to share common sentiments and needs. In the case of Western Sahara, the population there was controlled by Spanish power, instead of French one. Though the local clans were often fighting each other for foodstuffs and livestock, they awoke their unity when they encountered a new enemy, Spanish. As Smith said, "traumatic developments", for example, warfare (anti-colonial struggle), have power to create ethnic boundary (Smith, 1991: 25-27). This is the point at which Sahrawi as an ethnic unit was formalized by both "primordial" and "situational" factors.

During the anti-colonial "nationalism" period, some of them joined in the liberation movement as Maghrebians, and it gave political consciousness to the Sahrawi *ethnie*. The

anti-colonial "nationalism" rose in the beginning of 1970s and it was concluded with the "state-building" process; the foundation of SADR in 1976. However, almost half of the Sahrawi had to be left under the new ruler –the Moroccan authority– and became citizens of its state. In fact, they have not been included in the Sahrawi nationalism movement in the refugee camp, at least by the spatial way. SADR have tried to create national identity as Sahrawi "nation-state" in Tindouf through "nation-building". Here, the Sahrawi *ethnie* in the former Spanish region was divided into two states.

The important point here is the boundary of Sahrawi national identity. After 38 years of the division or diaspora, do Sahrawi maintain a common national identity which is based on their ethnic identity? This answer can be found in the empirical data which I discussed in the chapter 5. Two of the five Sahrawis in the interviews have Moroccan national identity, and the others have Sahrawi national identity. The former Sahrawis accept Moroccan rule in Western Sahara. One of them even positively understands that Laayoune has been dramatically developed through Moroccan investment. While they keep ethnic identity as Sahrawi, their national identity is shifted into Moroccan one. On the other hand, the latter Sahrawi felt frustrated with the Moroccan occupation. They share not only a common ethnic identity, but also a national identity as Sahrawi. Even though they are divided from SADR politics, their national goal is closer to the one from the Polisario. According to this data, depending on one's own experience, historical background, actual life condition will influence one's own political opinion toward the issue. Thus, it can be said that each Sahrawi chose national identity, either Moroccan or Sahrawi, by his/her political opinion.

Figure 13. Nation Imaging Process

I described the transformation process from *ethnie* to nation for Sahrawi in figure 13. Due to the political pressure, sub-ethnies (clans) create an *ethnie* called Sahrawi. During the anti-colonial period, *ethnie* stands up for "state-building" to seek an independent state. However, as a result of an emerging a new ruler, the *ethnie* was divided into two states; SADR and Morocco. After 38 years of diaspora, some of Sahrawi's national identity has been sifted to Moroccan one, and the other hand, some of their national identity stay within the ethnic boundary. At the same time, as the interview data 5 on the page 64 shows, one person could have several collective identities, as a Sahrawi or a Magharebian depending on the situation or whom she/he talk with. It is because individual collective identities have the form of concentric circles (figure 8 on page 33). Thus, I conclude the figure with the A zone, which means some Sahrawi's national identity are not crystal clear, it might switch depending on the situation.

6.2. National Identity Transformation: Coalition or Independence?

Related to the above discussion of national identity transformation, I come back the examples of Assyria (explained by Smith) and Ruritanians (mentioned by Gellner) cases in chapter 3. Assyria was naturally assimilated to the surrounding *ethnies* through cultural syncretism, particularly with use of common language. On the other hand, Ruritanians created an independent state through a nationalist movement. Although many of the Ruritanians, who moved to the city from their homeland, assimilated into Megalomanian language, they kept a Ruritanians ethnic identity. Ruritanian shared three features; 1) common homeland and language (past): Ruritanian peasants kept their own language (including the poetry and songs) and traditional life in their homeland which actually existed; 2) common life condition (present): most Ruritanians were discriminated in the city due to the backward rustic speaking and the quality of life in the slum; and 3) common goal (future): Ruritanian intellectuals who were educated in the city stood up for the nationalist movement based on their ethnic identity. These are the points which Assyria does not have.

Taking into account the first point, most of the Sahrawi who live under the Moroccan role speak Darija, even though most of them speak Hassaniya in their daily life. Darija is largely used in the public space and the media sources including the school education. Furthermore, their life is established in their own homeland, they can reach the Atlantic Ocean or the inland traditional town Smara. On the other hand, Sahrawi in the camp have kept using their traditional language, Haasaniya, in both public and private life. Because the refugee camp is very isolated in desert region, it is rare to get influence from other *ethnie*. Also, the camp is located outside of their homeland, the Western Sahara, thus, most of their young generation has never been to their homeland (except the liberated area in the east), even

though it actually existed.

Regarding the second point, Sahrawi under Moroccan rule can be provided with Moroccan citizenship. As long as they accept the condition, they obtain to some extent freedom of movement and activity, including traveling abroad with Moroccan passport.[101] Therefore, depending on the choice of each Sahrawi, one could live as a Moroccan citizen and another might resist to the provided condition. However, Sahrawi in the camp do not have much choice in their life. Firstly, SADR does not have a formal economy, freedom of enterprise, or the finances to dispense salaries or wages (Farah, 2012: 33). Their life is mainly supported by the international humanitarian aids. Secondly, although the SADR authority issues its own passports, it is practically useless if they want to travel to a state which has not recognized the sovereignty of SADR. It means that they do not have many opportunities to go out from the camp, besides obtaining Algerian passport. In addition, due to the natural environment of the camp –it is located in the middle of the great desert– their movement has been limited to the camp.

Based on the above different situations between Laayoune and the refugee camp, Sahrawi's political opinion on the future status of Western Sahara (the goal) is demonstrated differently. As we have just discussed, the Sahrawi in Tindouf are mostly lead by the leadership of Polisario which is seeking to establish Sahrawi nation-state. Although there are some confrontations between the authority and particular young generation (the latter groups claim to be backed armed resistance), it seems their national identity is united through the idea of total independence of Western Sahara. Like the Ruritanian case, Sahrawi in the camp share 1) common homeland and language, 2) common life condition as refugees and 3) a common goal to achieve independence; therefore, they seek to create their own nation-state.

On the contrary, it seems Sahrawi under Moroccan regime are more complicated. As I have already discussed in the first section of this chapter, two out of the five Sahrawi whom I interviewed consider their national identity as Moroccans. Their life situation can be compared to the Assyrian case. In fact, both of them fluently speak Darija, and more interestingly, one of them speaks Tamazight instead of Hassniya, but she wears Melhfa. She seems to have two ethnic identities, Sahrawi and Tamazight. In her case, her ethnic identity – either Sahrawi or Tamazight– transformed into Moroccan national identity as a way like other parts of the Tamazight population developed their ethnic identity to Moroccan national identity.

However, the other three responders have different views. Although two of them also speak Darija, their national identity is based on the Sahrawi ethnic identity. Why has their identity transformation process not taken the same road as the others? Two reasons are considered for this question. One is they share the idea of Sahrawi nationalism movement

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[101] However, we should not ignore the censorship of the Moroccan police, which have been controlling the activities of Sahrawi, particularly human right activists or journalists.

with the refugee camp. Even though there exists a geo-political boundary between Sahrawi in Laayoune and Tindouf, they share a common goal to unite Sahrawi national ties and to obtain total independence. The second reason is that they do not feel like they are Moroccan citizens. In other words, Moroccan authority could not normalize the situation in Western Sahara. As the responders in the page 73-74 stated, the confrontation between Moroccan police and local Sahrawi seems to deepen. One Moroccan informant who lives in Laayoune gave one example about the difference between them, "if we (Moroccan) say to Sahrawi that you should look right, then they will look left." Even though they share a common life space and citizen rights, it seems that the ethnic difference has been further highlighted in Laayoune. Discrimination toward Sahrawi also cannot be ignored. As an informant said, the demonstration in Gdeim Izik was not really seeking for the independent subject at the beginning, it was rather for socio-economic improvement; however, whenever demonstrations occur in Western Sahara, the Moroccan police become sensitive and they easily determine the reason of the demonstration as Sahrawi's independent movement. Hence, local Sahrawi feel high pressure against their activity under Moroccan rule. As a result, "Sahrawi hate the Moroccan police" (Page 74-75) and they increase the feeling toward their national identity.

Likewise collective identity has a multi-dimensional character, national identity is also shifted flexibly depending on both the "external" and the "internal" functions. The "external" function is related to the territorial, economic and political factors. The public mass education system, the use of national symbols, like flags, anthems and passport, give influence to the "internal" function. Some Sahrawi might shift their national identity into a Moroccan one because for economic reasons, life condition or use of common language, Darija. The others would feel a much deeper attachment with Sahrawi national identity because of the territorial dispute, political condition, their own flags and passport, etc. In short, national identity is determined by what functions or values the individual bases it on. According to this boundary, one's political opinion is demonstrated; either Assyrian case (integration) or Ruritanian case (independence).

6.3. Dilemma in Sahrawi National Unity

We understand from the above argument that national identity has multi-dimensional character. Now we should not ignore another aspect of nationalism, which has a more harmful character. As I already have discussed in the theory chapter, David's picture *"Oath of the Horatii"* shows that the power or faith of nationalism could kill real family. Camilla was killed by her brother because she shed tears for her betrothed death. Related to this point, Anderson said "nations inspire love, and often profoundly self-sacrificing love" (Anderson, 1983: 141). It means nationalism is promoted by love to their nation, *patria*. Nationalists might be able to sacrifice even themselves for the patria.

If I consider the situation of Sahrawi, it can be argued that the same thing is true here. As I mentioned before, a lot of families live separately between Laayoune and Tindouf refugee camp. One of my informants, who live in Laayoune, has visited his uncle and his family in Tindouf twice. Another informant, who is from Laayoune, has been also to the camp to meet her brothers. It is not only the family of Mohamed Abdelaziz, the president of SADR, but also many families who have members on the other side of the border.

However, as the empirical data show, the confrontation between Sahrawi in Laayoune and Tindouf cannot be ignored. One Sahrawi respondent from Laayoune said the people in Tindouf "think that we (Sahrawi in Laayoune) have a nice, calm life in Laayoune. And they are struggling for the difficult life in Tindouf" (page72). Also another Sahrawi respondent said about the riot in Laayoune in 2010 that the people from Tindouf "usually make noise for our life" (page 72). Moreover, there is an informant who imply as a possibility that another conflict within Sahrawi over the political power and natural resource may occur (page 80). Those opinions are summarized by the idea of one Sahrawi representative of the civil society organization in Laayoune. According to him, the most important negotiation should be the one amongst Sahrawis, instead of the one between Moroccan authority and the Polisario. He has been conscious of the gap within Sahrawi ethnic unity; therefore, he suggests that Sahrawi –both in Laayoune and Tindouf– should discuss a solution of the Western Sahara issue before the Polisario speak out as a representative of Sahrawi national unity. After 38 years of diaspora, it cannot be denied that their political opinion might go in different directions and it has been a trigger for the confrontation within the ethnic unity as "super-family" structure.

Nevertheless, I must point out the positive movement within the Sahrawi unity too. As the Gdeim Izik case shows, Sahrawi people are seeking a better solution to avoid confusion, even though they are caught by a dilemma whether they should stand up with arms to fight for their right of self-determination or they must keep cease-fire condition. As two respondents told me, the Gdeim Izik event did not reach to the worse circumstance, because the negotiation between the Sahrawi (the demonstrators in the Gdeim Izik camp and the military force) helped calm down the situation. They are quite aware of the consequence of armed conflict. Despite facing a hopeless condition; corruption of the local authority, distrust toward Moroccan government, disappointment to the international society, financial difficulty in the daily life and fear for arresting, Sahrawi chose to throw arms in Gdeim Izik.

So, what is the problem here? I describe it in figure 20. I divided the Sahrawi's political opinions into three categories. The first one is the group who accepted the Moroccan rule; therefore, they have a Moroccan national identity while they keep Sahrawi ethnic identity. The second group is the one who would accept the autonomous plan under the Moroccan sovereignty. They seek the Sahrawi national unity and have different national identity from Moroccan one. The last one is the Sahrawi people who claim total independence

as a nation-state. Needless to say, their national identity corresponds with ethnic identity. As we see here, there are two different political opinions within the same national unity. The second group and the third one do not share the same political idea for the future status of Western Sahara. At this point, the dilemma prevails within the Sahrawi national unity. Furthermore, as the representative of civil society organization which I mentioned above said, overcoming political dilemma will be a key to the conflict resolution.

Figure 20

6.4. Conclusion

I will now discuss this paper in order to explain the complicated character of the Western Sahara problem. The dispute has a root in colonization and the international situation. Controversy over the colonial boundary is one of the main causes of the conflict. "Nation-states" in the Maghreb (at least at the beginning) were born with the respect of the colonial boundary; however, the decolonization of Western Sahara could not pass the same road as other states did. It was used to create "Moroccan nationalism" by the Green March, at the same time, powerful states, for example the United States and France, supported pro-Western Moroccan regime under the Cold War condition. As a result of that, Spanish authority, who was under pressure of the United States, gave up the decolonization process of Western Sahara and ended its rule at almost the same time as General Franco's death. In

addition, because international organization, including the United Nations and the African Union, could not play sufficient roles to solve the problem, Sahrawi have been still divided between the refugee camp and the Moroccan occupied zone of Western Sahara for more than 38 years, and they are waiting for the resolution. Regional hegemony dispute between Morocco and Algeria, geo-political interests of the super-powers, Moroccan internal socio-political situation, economic interests (particularly phosphate) in Western Sahara and the inadequate role of the international organizations make the situation more complicated.

After understanding the character of the Western Sahara problem, I begin to analyze my research question, "is it possible to say that one's political opinion could change one's national identity? If the answer were yes, what is the cause to shift one's national identity?" For obtaining the answer to the question, I refer to the theory from Anthony Smith "*National Identity* (1991)". According to him, *ethnie* is formalized by both a "primordial" and a "situational" quality. The common cultural groups which are generally composed of "super-families" structure (for example, clan) create an *ethnie* when they faced with political pressure from the outside. Then, based on the *ethnie*, nation as a political community is formalized when it recognizes the necessity of autonomous structure to protect the groups. Generally, because nations seek their own sovereignty as an independent state, it is confused with the "nation-state". Based on those definitions, I discuss how the national boundary is drawn. Taking into account of the multi-dimensional character of national identity, the national boundary can be shifted depending on the purpose of the intellectuals or nationalists. "Why do we struggle?" and "who is our enemy?", the answers to those questions define the national identity. Furthermore, nationalism which is based on the strength of national identity could even harm real family ties. It was clearly illustrated to David's picture, *"Oath of the Horatii"*.

Based on the interview method, I conducted my field work in Las Palmas in Spain, Laayoune in Western Sahara and Marrakech in Morocco. For explaining the choice of national identity and citizenship, I introduced the case of Aminatou Haidar. It shows that the contradiction between "actual" Moroccan administer power and the international legal status of Western Sahara as non-self-governing territory produce confusion, because Moroccan government provides the passports which have an international legal function to people who live under non-self-governing area. As the Moroccan official said, a person who holds a Moroccan passport is automatically recognized as a Moroccan citizen as well as a Moroccan national. However, some Sahrawi who live under the Moroccan rule obtain the Moroccan passport (because there are no ways to obtain other passports), but they do not share the idea of national identity as Moroccans. At this point, the contradiction is occurred.

The passport issue has brought up the question of nationality. After thirty-eight years of the unsolved conflict situation, each Sahrawi chooses his/her nationality depending on the individual life history, experience, and actual economic condition. One might be able to

accept the Moroccan rule over Western Sahara, and he or she has transformed his/her nationality into Moroccan one while keeping Sahrawi ethnic identity. Another will say he or she can accept the Moroccan autonomous plan; however, he or she would not change the idea of his/her national identity as Sahrawi. Moreover, other Sahrawi fight for the right of self-determination and total independence of Western Sahara, so they also stay within the boundary of Sahrawi national unity.

One Sahrawi respondent said "we are tired enough of the situation, we would accept the autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty if the government could provide fair system". If the Moroccan authority can provide equal citizen right and a stable socio-economic condition, and respect each *ethnie* and its culture, some Sahrawi's national identity would be transformed to Moroccan one, or at least some Sahrawi can accept the autonomous condition within the Moroccan sovereignty. For example, according to the "Autonomous Region of Sahara" which Moroccan government suggested in 2003, natural resources, police and justice correspond to the Kingdom of Morocco, instead of Western Sahara autonomous government. This is just a small example which local Sahrawi do not feel as a "real" autonomous system. Whether Sahrawi can accept the suggestion or not depends on how much the Moroccan government can compromise to reach an autonomous system which Sahrawi will accept. Because nation is a political community, only political approach can change the situation.

Sahrawi people have been waiting for a solution for more than 38 years. One Sahrawi man from Tindouf showed me a bottle containing the sand from the coast of Laayoune. He said this smell of the sand brought back the memory of Laayoune. They did not choose to live in the harsh conditions of the middle of the great desert. But they cannot go "home" until they see a solution of the issue. As we see here, only a political approach can bring a solution. It means that not only Morocco and the Polisario, but also the former-colonial power Spain, "unofficial" supporters of Morocco, the United States, France and EU, and the international community should seek a political solution of the Western Sahara conflict before the scent of the sand disappears.

Timeline

1884	Spain places Western Sahara under its protection by the treaty with the local clan
1912	Final Convention defines Spanish and French Zone in Western Sahara
	France places Morocco under its protection
1956	Morocco obtains independence by "Maghreb" Nationalism
1958	Spain returns Spanish Southern Morocco (Tarfaya region) to Morocco
1961	King Hassan II becomes Moroccan sovereign after Mohammed V's death
1962	Spain discovers huge amount of phosphate in Bou Kra'a
1963	Morocco attempts to occupy disputed border area of Algeria
	Western Sahara was added to the list of none-self-government territories
1965	The UN General Assembly first calls on Spain to decolonize Western Sahara
1968	Sahrawi first liberation movement occurred by Mohammed Ibrahim Bassiri
1969	Spain returns Ifni to Morocco
1971	The first military Coup was attempted in Morocco
1972	The second military Coup was occurred in Morocco
1973	Sahrawi second liberation movement is begun by El-Ouali Mustapha Said
	The Polisario Front is established
1974	The Polisario announces the goal of total independence of Western Sahara
	Morocco and Mauritania ask the question of Western Sahara to the ICJ
1975	October: ICJ publish the advisory opinion on Western Sahara issue
	November: Green March (Moroccan nationalism) is conducted
	November: Madrid Accord signed by Morocco, Mauritania and Spain
	November: General Franco dies
	Almost half of the Sahrawi population refuge to Tindouf
1976	January: Moroccan military crashes with Algerian troop in Amgala
	February: Spain withdraw from Western Sahara
	February: SADR is declared by the Polisario, the refugee camp is established
	June: The leader of the Polisario El-Ouali Mustapha Said dies
	August: Mohammed Abdelaziz elected Secretary-General of the Polisario
1979	August: Mauritania agrees cease-fire with the Polisario
	August: Morocco takes after the Mauritanian Western Sahara zone
1981	Morocco builds the defensive wall (berm)
1982	Morocco and the US reach
1984	SADR becomes a member of the OAU
	Morocco withdraws from the OAU
1988	May: Morocco and Algeria re-establish diplomatic relation
	August: Pérez de Cuéllar proposes the Settlement Plan, both Morocco and the

Polisario accept it

1989 January: The Marrakech Direct Talk between Hassan II and the Polisario Front

   February: Maghreb Arab Union is found

1991 April: MINURSO is found

   September: Morocco and the Polisario reach to Cease-fire

1997 James Baker becomes a United Nation Special Representative in Western Sahara, Morocco and the Polisario agreed with the Huston Accords

1999 July: Hassan II dies, Mohammed VI enthrones

   December: Voter list is completed for the referendum

2001 May: James Baker introduces "Baker Plan I", the Polisario and Algeria reject

   2003 January: James Baker introduces "Baker Plan II", the Polisario surprisingly accepts the plan, but Morocco rejects and proposes the Autonomy for Western Sahara Plan

2004 June: James Baker resigns

   Peter Van Walsum is confirmed as the new UN Special Representative in Western Sahara

2005 The Polisario releases 404 of the Moroccan prisoner-of-war

2006 US, Spain and France support the Autonomy for Western Sahara Plan

2007 Both Morocco and the Polisario agree with the direct negotiation, Manhasset Negotiations are hold four times

2009 Christopher Ross is nominated as a UN Special Representative in Western Sahara

2011 The UN backed informal talks between Morocco and the Polisario are launched

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